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PUBLIC DOMAIN PRESERVATION IN 
EU TRADEMARK LAW— 
A MODEL FOR OTHER REGIONS? 
By Martin Senftleben∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Initiatives aiming at the preservation of the public domain 
constitute an important element of the WIPO Development 
Agenda.1 With the Study on Misappropriation of Signs,2 the 
international debate on how to preserve a rich and accessible 
public domain has reached trademark law.3 This debate raises 
fundamental questions about the relationship between the 
rationales of trademark protection and the need to safeguard the 
public domain. How should the public domain be defined in 
relation to the trademark system? Which preservation tools are 
available under trademark law? What lessons can be learned from 
the way in which these tools are used in different countries? How 
can these experiences be translated into best practices that can 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Professor of Intellectual Property, VU University Amsterdam; Senior Consultant, 
Bird & Bird, The Hague. I would like to thank Michael Handler, Lisa Ramsey, the 
participants of the 2012 WIPO Advanced Research Forum on Intellectual Property Rights, 
and the 2013 Drake Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable, and the editors of this 
journal for valuable comments on previous drafts and presentations. 
 1. See, e.g., WIPO Development Agenda, Adopted Recommendation 16: (“Consider the 
preservation of the public domain within WIPO’s normative processes and deepen the 
analysis of the implications and benefits of a rich and accessible public domain”), Adopted 
Recommendation 20: (“To promote norm-setting activities related to IP that support a 
robust public domain in WIPO’s Member States, including the possibility of preparing 
guidelines that could assist interested Member States in identifying subject matters that 
have fallen into the public domain within their respective jurisdictions”), both available at 
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html. For commentary, see 
the various contributions to The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and 
Developing Countries (N.W. Netanel ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009).  
 2. Study on Misappropriation of Signs (M.R.F. Senftleben ed.), WIPO Document 
CDIP/9/INF/5, dated Mar. 14, 2012, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/ 
en/cdip_9/cdip_9_inf_5.pdf. 
 3. For previous studies concerning copyright and patent law, see S. Dussolier, Scoping 
Study on Copyright and Related Rights and the Public Domain, WIPO document 
CDIP/4/3/Rev./STUDY/INF/1, dated May 7, 2010, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3_rev_study_inf_1.pdf; J. Phillips, Study on Patents and the 
Public Domain, WIPO document CDIP/4/3 Rev./Study/INF/2, dated Apr. 27, 2011, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/ mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3_rev_study_inf_2.pdf. Cf. also 
L. Bently, B. Sherman, & D. Borges Barbosa et al., Exclusions from Patentability and 
Exceptions and Limitations to Patentees’ Rights, WIPO document SCP/15/3, Annex 1, dated 
Sept. 2, 2010, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15_3-
annex1.pdf. 
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serve as guidelines for countries seeking to support a robust public 
domain? 
Against this background, the present article explores the 
notion of the public domain with regard to trademark law. It will 
be argued that a broad conception of the public domain is 
appropriate—a conception that, besides signs unencumbered by 
trademark rights, includes user freedoms resulting from a limited 
scope of protection. By surveying the universal rules laid down in 
international treaties, four categories of preservation tools can be 
distinguished on this basis: a general bar to trademark protection, 
the exclusion based on a sign’s lack of distinctiveness, inherent 
limits of exclusive rights and the adoption of exceptions (see 
Part II below). After this conceptual clarification, the use of the 
identified preservation mechanisms in EU trademark law will be 
analyzed to illustrate the role that the different tools can play in 
safeguarding the public domain (see Part III below). The EU is an 
interesting example because it reflects a regional rather than 
national approach that includes countries from both the 
continental-European and the Anglo-American tradition. The 
analysis gives rise to the question whether the EU approach can 
serve as a model for other regions (see Parts IV and V below).  
II. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
In the trademark system, as in other fields of intellectual 
property, public domain material plays an important role. A 
reservoir of signs available for common use offers traders equal 
access to communication tools that can be used to inform 
consumers about product characteristics and compete for market 
shares. Freedom to use descriptive signs and generic indications 
ensures that merchants can easily convey information about their 
goods or services.4 A commons of functional product elements 
further enhances competition by supporting the development of 
product alternatives.5  
                                                                                                                 
 4. Cf. A. Peukert, Die Gemeinfreiheit 26-27 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012); T. 
Sambuc, Das Freihaltebedürfnis an beschreibenden Angaben und der Ware selbst nach dem 
Markengesetz, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 403 (1997). For a critical 
comment on the need to keep free in trademark law, see J. Phillips, Trade Mark Law and 
the Need to Keep Free—Intellectual Property Monopolies Have Their Limits, 36 Int’l Rev. 
Intell. Prop. & Competition Law 389 (2005). 
 5. For a court decision confirming this rationale underlying the functionality doctrine, 
see the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of June 18, 2002, 
Case C-299/99, Philips/Remington, ¶ 78: “The rationale of the grounds for refusal of 
registration laid down in Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive is to prevent trade mark protection 
from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics 
of a product which a user is likely to seek in the products of competitors. Article 3(1)(e) is 
thus intended to prevent the protection conferred by the trade mark right from being 
extended, beyond signs which serve to distinguish a product or service from those offered by 
competitors, so as to form an obstacle preventing competitors from freely offering for sale 
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Besides the interest in free and fair competition, signs in the 
public domain also satisfy speech interests of the general public. If 
signs of particular significance, such as cultural and religious 
symbols, are freely available for all, their meanings and 
connotations can be discussed and developed in an open 
communication process that is not dominated by an individual 
rights owner. They also remain free for political, educational, 
social, and cultural purposes.6  
Besides the interest in a reservoir of signs free for common 
use, the public interest in the availability of signs also concerns 
trademarks enjoying protection. This public interest is closely 
related to political and artistic freedom of expression. As observed 
by Professor Dreyfuss, trademarks 
have become products in their own right, valued as indicators 
of the status, preferences, and aspirations of those who use 
them. Some trademarks have worked their way into the 
English language; others provide bases for vibrant, evocative 
metaphors. In a sense, trademarks are the emerging lingua 
franca: with a sufficient command of these terms, one can 
make oneself understood the world over, and in the process, 
enjoy the comforts of home.7  
As trademarks have become focal points of communication—
densely packed information units “infused with sets of denotations 
and associated connotations”—loss of the possibility to use 
trademarks might impede the ability to communicate.8 Against 
this background, Dreyfuss described the need to continue to allow 
the expressive use of the associations and meanings triggered by a 
trademark.9 Commentators should be free to use trademarks as a 
basis for criticizing an enterprise’s policies. Artists should be able 
to include trademarks in their creative productions. Consumers 
                                                                                                                 
products incorporating such technical solutions or functional characteristics in competition 
with the proprietor of the trade mark.” 
 6. For a more detailed analysis of the need to keep signs of cultural and religious 
significance free, see K. Assaf, Der Markenschutz und seine kulturelle Bedeutung, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Int’l 1 (2009); M.R.F. Senftleben, Der 
kulturelle Imperativ des Urheberrechts, in Kunst im Markt 75 (M. Weller, N.B. Kemle, T. 
Dreier, P.M. Lynen eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010); C. van Woensel, Merk, god en verbod 
(Amstelveen: deLex 2007). However, see also M. Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 
26 Sydney L. Rev. 193, 213-215 (2004), who argues for the adoption of an incentive rationale 
in trademark law that seeks to stimulate popular brand culture and new brand language.  
 7. R.C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 398 (1990). 
 8. Id. at 415. See also K. Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to be American: 
Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and 
Free Speech Norms, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 523, 542-43 (1997). 
 9. Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 415-418.  
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should be free to refer to trademarks as symbols of a particular 
lifestyle or attitude.10  
It has also been pointed out that the richness of associations 
and meanings attached to a trademark is not solely attributable to 
the trademark owner; rather, it is the result of efforts of both 
trademark owners and consumers. The consuming public 
frequently imbues trademarks with connotations distinct from and 
sometimes unrelated to the advertising messages conveyed by the 
trademark owner.11 The entitlement of the general public to the 
use of trademarks in social and cultural discourse, therefore, can 
also be seen as the result of the public’s own contributions to the 
association of complex meanings and connotations with particular 
trade symbols.  
Given the diversity of stakeholders and interests involved, it is 
of particular importance to develop an appropriate definition of the 
“public domain” in trademark law—a definition broad enough to 
lend sufficient weight to the social, cultural, and economic 
interests ranging from fair competition to freedom of speech, and 
narrow enough to leave room for the attainment of the objectives 
underlying trademark protection.  
                                                                                                                 
 10. Cf. P. Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: 
Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 887 (2005). 
For an overview of the debate on trademark law and freedom of expression, see W. Sakulin, 
Trademark Protection and Freedom of Expression—An Inquiry into the Conflict between 
Trademark Rights and Freedom of Expression under European Law (The Hague/ 
London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2010); C. Geiger, Marques et droits 
fondamentaux, in Les défis du droit des marques au XXIe siècle, 163 (C. Geiger/J. Schmidt-
Szalewski eds., Strasbourg: Litec 2010); R. Burrell & D. Gangjee, Trade Marks and Freedom 
of Expression: A Call for Caution, 41 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. Comp. L. 544 (2010); M. Nasser, 
Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression, 40 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Comp. L. 188 (2009); 
L. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trade Mark Law, 61 SMU L. Rev. 381 
(2008); W. McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1205 (2008); Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual 
Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the 
European Union, 37 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. Competition L. 371, 395-397 (2006); P.N. Leval, 
Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 187 (2004); K.L. Timbers & J. 
Huston, The “Artistic Relevance Test” Just Became Relevant: The Increasing Strength of the 
First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark Infringement and Dilution, 93 TMR 1278 
(2003); R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How to 
Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of 
Contemporary Research 261 (G.B. Dinwoodie & M.D. Janis eds., Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2008). 
 11. Cf. D.R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 101 
(2010); L.A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory 
of the Consumer, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 651 (2009); J. Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public 
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 Yale L.J. 1, 15-16 (1999); S. Wilf, Who Authors 
Trademarks?, 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1 (1999); A. Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960 (1993); L.P Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark 
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 Buffalo L. Rev. 851 (2010). However, see 
the critical comments on the limitation of trademark rights made by M. Richardson, Trade 
Marks and Language, 26 Sydney L. Rev. 193 (2004). 
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In scholarly literature, several definitions have arisen from 
reflections on the meaning and function of the public domain.12 
Providing a general overview, Professor Samuelson identified 
different conceptual approaches, including definitions based on the 
legal status of public domain material and definitions focusing on 
freedom to use protected intellectual creations.13 Legal status 
definitions typically consider as “public domain” material that is 
unencumbered by intellectual property rights. They focus on 
material that is ineligible for protection, or that no longer enjoys 
protection after the expiry of protection (see Part II.A below). 
Public domain definitions focusing on freedom of use, by contrast, 
allow for the development of a broader concept of the public 
domain. Instead of asking whether material is completely free 
from trademark protection, they pose the question whether and to 
what extent material can be used freely, notwithstanding another 
party’s trademark rights (see Part II.B below). To arrive at an 
appropriate understanding of how trademark law can contribute to 
the preservation of the public domain, it is advisable to consider 
both approaches (see Part II.C below).  
A. Definitions Based on Legal Status 
Under typical legal status definitions, in order for any 
material to be considered “public domain,” it must be completely 
unencumbered by intellectual property rights. Trademark law, 
however, does not draw a fixed temporal boundary line between 
that which is private and subject to individual ownership, and that 
which is public and part of the intellectual commons. In principle, 
protection can be maintained as long as the trademark owner 
continues to use the protected sign and renews its registration.14 
                                                                                                                 
 12. For a discussion of different conceptions of the public domain, see the contributions 
to The Future of the Public Domain—Identifying the Commons in Information Law 
(L.M.C.R. Guibault & P.B. Hugenholtz eds., The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law 
International 2006); and J. Boyle ed., The Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
(2003), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol66/iss1/. With regard to the 
foundations of the debate on the public domain, see D. Lange, Recognizing the Public 
Domain, 44 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147 (1981); J. Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory 
L.J. 965 (1990). As to the debate on the freedom of speech underpinning, see D.L. 
Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 
Fordham L. Rev. 297 (2004); Y. Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the 
Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 173 (2003). 
For an overview of different aspects of the public domain in relation to trademark law, see 
Peukert, supra note 4, at 18-37. 
 13. P. Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 Duke L.J. 783, 816-823  
(2006). As to problems in tracing the conceptual contours of the public domain, see P. 
Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain in: Guibault/Hugenholtz, supra note 
12, at 7, 13-17. 
 14. See Article 18 of the TRIPS Agreement: “Initial registration, and each renewal of 
registration, of a trademark shall be for a term of no less than seven years. The registration 
of a trademark shall be renewable indefinitely.” The requirement of use follows from Article 
19 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Trademark law thus does not guarantee the enrichment of the 
public domain through a limited term of protection (see Part II.A.1 
below). However, it leaves signs unaffected that do not satisfy 
basic protection requirements, such as distinctiveness and 
graphical representation (see Part II.A.2 below). Moreover, certain 
signs, i.e., functional signs or statutorily protected symbols, are 
generally excluded from registration and protection as trademarks 
(see Part II.A.3 below). 
1. No Contribution to Public Domain 
on the Basis of a Limited Term of Protection 
Trademark law seeks to ensure market transparency. In a 
transparent market where distinctive signs are exclusively linked 
with the goods or services stemming from one individual 
commercial source, an enterprise can clearly identify its offer in 
the marketplace, and consumers can easily individualize different 
offers and express their preference by selecting one specific 
product or service.15 This, in turn, will help the public’s preferred 
suppliers, products and services to prevail in the marketplace. 
Contributing to the regulation of supply and demand in this way, 
trademark law supports the proper functioning of markets. The 
guarantee of market transparency through trademark protection 
ensures fair competition between market participants and the 
protection of consumers against confusion.  
Trademark law would not be able to realize these objectives if 
the term of protection were strictly limited. A temporal limitation 
would have the effect that all market participants could freely use 
the trademark after the expiry of protection. In consequence, 
consumers could no longer rely on the trademark as an indicator of 
commercial source. The trademark could no longer contribute to 
market transparency and fair competition. It would lose its 
identifying function and the capacity to support the proper 
functioning of the market. For this reason, the trademark owner 
can renew the registration of the trademark indefinitely.16 The 
rule of indefinite renewal allows an enterprise to uphold the 
exclusive link with its trademarks as long as it keeps using them 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Cf. D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 266 (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 3d ed. 2008). With regard to the economic search costs argument that is 
related to this function of trademarks, see J. Griffiths, A Law-and-Economic Perspective on 
Trade Marks, in Trade Marks and Brands—An Interdisciplinary Critique 241 (L. Bently, J. 
Davis & J.C. Ginsburg eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008); M. Strasser, 
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into 
Context, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 375, 379-382 (2000). With regard to 
questions arising in the digital environment, see S. L. Dogan & M.A. Lemley, Trademarks 
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777 (2004). 
 16. Article 18 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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in trade.17 The distinctiveness of trademarks used in the market 
can thus be preserved, and consumers and the public at large are 
not misled.  
Copyrights and patents, by contrast, necessarily expire after a 
limited term, thus ensuring the constant enrichment of the public 
domain. The reason for this fundamental difference lies in 
different rationales of protection. Copyright law and patent law 
seek to offer an incentive and reward for the creation of 
intellectual property, and support its disclosure and dissemination. 
Protection thus expires after a period of time that is deemed 
sufficient to secure the intended incentive and reward.18 The 
constant enrichment of the public domain is a corollary of the 
grant of protection.19 
Even without a similar rationale, trademark protection need 
not last forever. The registration of a trademark that is no longer 
used in the marketplace may be cancelled after an uninterrupted 
period of at least three years of inexcusable non-use.20 As a result, 
the sign concerned becomes available anew for other market 
participants—at least to the extent that national law allows other 
market participants to adopt it after cancellation. The cancellation 
action, however, will normally be brought by a competitor who 
wishes to use an identical or similar sign.21 Cancellation based on 
non-use, therefore, does not necessarily ensure that the sign will 
return to the public domain and become freely available for all.  
                                                                                                                 
 17. As Article 19 of the TRIPS Agreement indicates, use may be required to maintain a 
trademark’s registration. The registration may be cancelled after an uninterrupted period of 
at least three years of non-use, unless valid reasons based on the existence of obstacles to 
such use are shown by the trademark owner. 
 18. See Article 7 of the Berne Convention and Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement with 
regard to the international minimum terms of protection in the field of copyright and patent 
law. 
 19. See M.D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in Guibault & 
Hugenholtz, supra note 12, at 59-60: “. . . least under an instrumentalist view of copyright 
law, the public domain is not merely—or rather should not be—an unintended byproduct, or 
‘graveyard’ of copyrighted works, but its very goal.” Cf. Dussolier, supra note 3, at 6-7, for a 
discussion of different notions of public domain in the field of copyright and related rights. 
For an analysis focusing on the furtherance of creativity, see J.E. Cohen, Copyright, 
Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in Guibault & Hugenholtz, 
supra note 12, at 121, 157-164. For an overview of issues concerning the relationship 
between patent protection and the public domain, see Phillips, supra note 3, at 32-37. With 
regard to concerns about a shrinking public domain of science and potential remedies, see 
G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible 
Knowledge, in Guibault & Hugenholtz, supra note 12, at 191, 209-221. 
 20. Cf. Article 19 of the TRIPS Agreement, which also clarifies that cancellation does 
not take place where the trademark owner had valid reasons based on the existence of 
obstacles to genuine use. In national or regional trademark systems, different terminology—
in particular the term “revocation”—may be used. See, e.g., Article 51 of the Community 
Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009. 
 21. For instance, see the situation underlying CJEU, Mar. 11, 2003, Case C-40/01, 
Ajax/Ansul.  
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Signs that have become generic, by contrast, become generally 
available for the public at large. Registered trademarks that 
constitute generic expressions can be invalidated on the grounds 
that they have become customary identifiers of specific goods or 
services in current language.22 In national legislation, however, the 
invalidation based on genericism may depend on whether the 
trademark owner contributed to the process rendering the 
trademark generic, or failed to take measures against this 
development.23 A trademark, therefore, does not necessarily fall 
into the public domain automatically when it becomes a customary 
expression in current language.  
On balance, it is thus to be conceded that trademark law, 
being incapable of providing for a limited term of protection, does 
not seem to offer much support for the public domain.24 The crucial 
question, then, is whether trademark law offers sufficient 
safeguards against the acquisition of trademark rights—and 
potential encroachment upon the public domain—by setting forth 
strict criteria for determining eligibility for trademark protection. 
Do the eligibility criteria applied in trademark law offer sufficient 
room for excluding signs from protection that should remain in the 
public domain? 
                                                                                                                 
 22. At the international level, Article 6quinquies(B) No. 2 of the Paris Convention 
reflects genericism as a ground for refusing telle quelle (as is) registration and protection of 
trademarks stemming from other Paris Union Members. 
 23. In the Benelux, for instance, Article 2.26(2)(b) of the Benelux Treaty on Intellectual 
Property allows the invalidation only in cases where the trademark owner contributed to 
the process rendering the trademark generic or failed to take measures against this 
development. 
 24. This conclusion may be nuanced by considering the interplay between property 
rights and the enrichment of the public domain described by E.M. Salzberger, Economic 
Analysis of the Public Domain, in Guibault & Hugenholtz, supra note 12, at 27, 55: “Let us 
assume that the government changes the designation of particular common land into 
private property, this piece of land is subsequently purchased by an individual on which she 
builds an architectural masterpiece. This new building is privately owned in the sense that 
no one can enter the building, use it, sell it, or eliminate it save its private owner or under 
her permission. But the pleasure of viewing the building for the rest of the community, the 
inspiration it creates, its contribution to future architectural plans can be regarded as an 
enlargement of the public domain.” In this vein, it might be argued that trademark 
protection—even though being potentially renewed indefinitely—still enlarges the public 
domain by adding complex meanings to a formerly undeveloped sign in the public domain. 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that, in contrast to creations protected by copyright or patent 
law, trademarked signs with rich connotations do not automatically fall into the public 
domain after a limited period of time. Moreover, the question arises whether the diverse 
meanings attached to a trademark primarily stem from the trademark owner. In this latter 
regard, see the literature references supra note 11. 
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2. Conditional Exclusion Following from the 
Requirement of Distinctiveness as a 
Criterion for Trademark Protection 
For a sign to constitute a trademark, it must be capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those 
of other undertakings.25 Signs that do not fulfill this basic 
eligibility criterion, such as nondistinctive, descriptive, and generic 
signs,26 remain outside the protection system and thus 
unencumbered by trademark rights. They remain part of the 
public domain.  
However, a sign that is not inherently distinctive may, over 
time and as a result of use and advertising, acquire the capacity to 
distinguish goods or services.27 A nondistinctive, descriptive, or 
generic sign may thus become a trademark—and be removed from 
the public domain—the moment it acquires the necessary 
distinctiveness as a consequence of use in trade.28 This additional 
rule can be understood to make inroads into the public domain: 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Article 15(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. As to the question whether this 
provision requires WTO Members to automatically accept each and every sign or 
combination of signs capable of distinguishing goods or services for trademark registration 
and protection, see C.M. Correa, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, 179-180 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 
referring to the WTO Appellate Body decision in United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, WTO Document WT/DS176/AB/R, dated Jan. 2, 2002, ¶ 155: 
“Identifying certain signs that are capable of registration and imposing on WTO Members 
an obligation to make those signs eligible for registration in their domestic legislation is not 
the same as imposing on those Members an obligation to register automatically each and 
every sign or combination of signs that are capable of and eligible for registration under 
Article 15.1. This Article describes which trademarks are ‘capable of’ registration. It does 
not say that all trademarks that are capable of registration ‘shall be registered’.” 
 26. These categories of signs ineligible for trademark protection are reflected in the 
absolute grounds for refusal of many countries. See also the international regulation of telle 
quelle protection in Article 6quinquies(B) No. 2 and 6quinquies(A)(1) of the Paris 
Convention. Cf. M. Pflüger, PC, Article 6quinquies, in Concise International and European 
IP Law 235-241 (T. Cottier & P. Véron eds., Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2d ed. 2011); H.P. Kunz-Hallstein, Article 6quinquies PVÜ – Grundlage einer 
einheitlichen Eintragungspraxis von Marken in der Gemeinschaft?, Markenrecht 487 (2006); 
F.K. Beier, Unterscheidungskraft und Freihaltebedürfnis—Zur Markenschutzfähigkeit 
individueller Herkunftsangaben nach § 4 WZG und Article 6quinquies PVÜ, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International 243 (1992); S.P. Ladas, II Patents, 
Trademarks, and Related Rights—National and International Protection, 1211-1240 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1975); G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide 
to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, WIPO 
Publication No. 611 113-119 (Geneva: BIRPI 1969). 
 27. This is also reflected in Article 15(1) of the TRIPS Agreement: “Where signs are not 
inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services, Members may make 
registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through use.” 
 28. National law may also exclude the acquisition of trademark rights with regard to 
certain types of these signs altogether. U.S. trademark law, for instance, does not offer the 
possibility of acquiring distinctive character through use in the case of generic signs. Cf. B. 
Beebe, Report on Canada and the United States of America, in Senftleben, supra note 2, at 
69, 82-83.  
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trademark protection relating to signs that belonged to the public 
domain can result from marketing efforts that educate consumers 
to perceive a formerly nondistinctive, descriptive, or generic sign 
as a reference to one particular commercial source. Once the 
required link is established in the minds of consumers, the sign 
may be protected as a trademark. The exclusion from trademark 
protection is thus conditional on the absence of acquired 
distinctiveness. 
Considering the rationales underlying trademark law, it may 
be said that trademark law seeks to recognize the marketing 
efforts made by an individual trader and protect consumers 
against confusion by providing for the possibility of acquiring 
distinctiveness through use in trade. The moment a nondistinctive, 
descriptive, or generic sign is perceived as a reference to one 
particular commercial source, it seems to become necessary, from 
this perspective, to inhibit other traders from using that particular 
sign.29 The boundary line between trademark protection and the 
public domain, then, depends on the requirements established by 
trademark offices and the courts to determine whether distinctive 
character has been acquired through use. 
3. Unconditional Exclusion from Trademark Protection 
The exclusion of signs from trademark protection can be 
stricter when it is based on the fundamental notion that a 
trademark cannot constitute an essential feature of the product or 
service to which it is attached. A trademark, by definition, is a 
source identifier attached to goods or services. It is not the product 
or service as such. For instance, a shape that is required to obtain 
a particular technical result may be held to be ineligible for 
trademark protection because it constitutes an indispensable 
feature of the product itself rather than serving as a mere badge of 
origin. The same rationale can be invoked with regard to aesthetic 
features affecting the product’s value or quality: rather than 
constituting identifiers of commercial source, these essential 
features define the product itself. Accordingly, the view may be 
held that they cannot be regarded as trademarks.30 
                                                                                                                 
 29. For a critique of the circularity in this line of argument, see L.P. Ramsey, 
Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1095, 1150 (2003); R.C. 
Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for 
the Protection of Trade Symbols, Wis. L. Rev. 158, 170 (1982). 
 30. In this sense, Supreme Court of Canada, Nov. 17, 2005, Kirkbi AG/Ritvik Holdings 
Inc., 2005 S.C.C. 65, ¶ 46. As to the different lines of argument developed in this case, see 
B.W. Stratton & H. Lue, Lego v. Mega Bloks in the Supreme Court of Canada: Ephemeral 
Rights in Toy Bricks, 96 TMR 587 (2006); R.S. Levy, The Lego Case: The Supreme Court of 
Canada Makes it Harder to Protect Product Shapes as Trademarks, 96 TMR 596 (2006); 
R.H.C. MacFarlane & C.M. Pallotta, Kirkbi Ag and Lego Canada Inc v. Ritvik Holdings Inc.: 
A Review of the Canadian Decisions, 96 TMR 575 (2006). See also Peukert, supra note 4, at 
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In the case of utilitarian or aesthetic functionality, the 
exclusion from trademark protection may thus be applied more 
strictly than in the case of nondistinctive, descriptive, or generic 
signs. In national legislation, signs necessary to obtain a technical 
result or adding substantial value or quality to the product may 
generally be excluded from protection as a trademark, even if the 
sign concerned has acquired distinctive character as a result of the 
use made of it in trade. The exclusion from trademark protection, 
in other words, may be unconditional in the sense that signs of 
this nature cannot be removed from the public domain through the 
acquisition of trademark rights, notwithstanding that such signs 
may have acquired distinctiveness as source identifiers.31 
Further instances of an unconditional exclusion from 
trademark registration and protection are reflected in 
international trademark law. In the context of the regulation of 
telle quelle protection in Article 6quinquies of the Paris 
Convention, it is pointed out that Paris Union countries are not 
obliged to accept for registration and protection signs duly 
registered in other countries of the Union “when they are contrary 
to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a nature as to 
deceive the public.”32 
Furthermore, Article 6ter of the Paris Convention excludes 
from registration and use as trademarks, or elements of 
trademarks, “armorial bearings, flags, and other State emblems, of 
the countries of the Union, official signs and hallmarks indicating 
control and warranty adopted by them, and any imitation from a 
heraldic point of view.”33 
Therefore, international trademark law recognizes the need to 
exclude certain official signs from trademark protection. It also 
                                                                                                                 
23-25, recognizing the distinction between trademark and trademarked product as a basis 
for exclusions from protection. 
 31. For instance, see supra Supreme Court of Canada, ¶¶ 40 & 46; CJEU, Sept. 14, 
2010, Case C-48/09 P, Lego/Mega Brands, ¶¶ 40 & 47. 
 32. Article 6quinquies(B) No. 3 of the Paris Convention. 
 33. Article 6ter(1)(a) and (b) of the Paris Convention. The same rule applies to armorial 
bearings, flags, other emblems, abbreviations, and names, of international 
intergovernmental organizations. Id. See also WIPO Document SCT/15/3, dated Oct. 14, 
2005, Article 6ter of the Paris Convention: Legal and Administrative Aspects, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/sct. For commentary, see cf. M. Pflüger, PC, Article 6quinquies, in 
Concise International and European IP Law 229-233 (T. Cottier & P. Véron eds., 2d ed., 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2011); G. Pacek, Marks as Imitations of 
State Emblems “From a Heraldic Point of View,” 4 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 673 (2009); S.P. 
Ladas, II Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights—National and International Protection 
1240-1247 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1975); G.H.C. 
Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, WIPO Publication No. 611 94-99 (Geneva: BIRPI 1969); G. Ronga, Der 
Schutz von Kennzeichen zwischenstaatlicher Organisationen nach der Pariser 
Verbandsübereinkunft, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International 148 
(1966). 
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leaves discretion to national authorities with regard to the 
identification of signs that are inappropriate for trademark 
registration and protection because of a conflict with morality or 
public order, or their deceptive nature. On this basis, signs can be 
excluded from trademark protection, irrespective of whether the 
sign concerned is distinctive or not.34 
An exclusion from trademark registration may also follow 
from practical requirements concerning the trademark register. 
For a sign to be entered in a traditional analogue register, it must 
be capable of graphical representation. In line with Article 15(1) of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement), national law may also require, as a 
condition of registration, that signs be visually perceptible. These 
registration requirements become particularly relevant in the case 
of nontraditional trademarks. A smell or sound mark, for instance, 
is not visually perceptible. A smell mark may also be held not to be 
capable of graphical representation.35 As a result, smell and/or 
sound may remain outside the trademark protection system 
altogether. 
B. Definitions Based on Freedom of Use 
by Competitors or the Public 
Definitions focusing on freedom to use intellectual creations 
offer a more expansive view of the public domain. Besides material 
that is unencumbered by intellectual property rights, this broader 
approach allows the inclusion of forms of use that, even though an 
intellectual creation enjoys protection, fall outside the scope of the 
exclusive rights of the rights owner.36 In the context of trademark 
law, this broader perspective is of particular interest. Inherent 
limits to trademark rights (see Part II.B.1 below) and the freedom 
of national lawmakers to adopt limited exceptions (see Part II.B.2 
below) can lead to the exemption of several forms of socially, 
culturally, and economically important use from the control of the 
trademark owner and concomitant strengthening of the public 
domain.  
                                                                                                                 
 34. With regard to the question whether an exclusion from registration and use as a 
trademark because of a “cultural offence,” or the grant of trademark protection in a 
defensive sense, might also be appropriate in the area of signs and emblems of indigenous 
peoples, see S.R. Frankel, Third-Party Trade Marks as a Violation of Indigenous Cultural 
Property—A New Statutory Safeguard, 8 J. World Intell. Prop. 83 (2005). 
 35. This is the position taken by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
See CJEU, Dec. 12, 2002, Case C-273/00, R. Sieckmann.  
 36. For a public domain conception of this type, see Y. Benkler, Free as the Air to 
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 354, 361-162 (1999), where Benkler argues for including “use generally considered 
permissible, absent peculiar facts to the contrary.” Cf. also the similar approach developed 
by R.P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 183, 184 (2004). 
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1. Inherent Limits of Exclusive Rights 
The exclusive rights of trademark owners are inherently 
limited in several respects. In contrast to copyright law, trademark 
law does not grant a general right of “reproduction” or a general 
right of “communication to the public.”37 In contrast to patent law, 
trademark law does not grant a general right of “making” and 
“using.”38 In principle, trademark protection against confusion 
covers only those goods or services with which the trademark is 
used or registered, or goods or services closely related thereto. The 
scope of exclusivity may be broader in countries extending 
protection to confusion about affiliation, sponsorship, or approval. 
However, a claim based on protection against confusion requires a 
showing of likelihood of confusion.39 Moreover, unauthorized use is 
actionable only as long as it takes place in the course of trade. In 
several national systems, this basic infringement criterion is 
accompanied by a further requirement of use “as a trademark.” 
Because of this additional requirement, use may not be actionable 
if it is unlikely to be perceived as an indication of commercial 
origin by consumers.  
With regard to the aim to preserve the public domain, these 
inherent limits of trademark rights in the field of protection 
against confusion are of particular importance. Even if trademark 
protection is acquired, exclusive trademark rights do not enable 
the trademark owner to exert unlimited control over the use of the 
sign concerned. Noncommercial use for private, religious, cultural, 
educational, or political purposes may fall outside the scope of the 
exclusive right because it does not constitute use in the course of 
trade. Mere references to the protected trademark, for instance in 
the context of news reporting, criticism, review, or parody, may not 
be actionable as long as the reference is not understood as an 
indication of commercial source. 
However, the trademark rights awarded to ensure protection 
against confusion offer sufficient legal security for substantial 
investment in the sign concerned. At least with regard to those 
goods or services, in respect of which the sign is used or registered 
as a trademark, the trademark owner can rely on exclusive rights. 
In consequence, the trademark becomes a channel of 
communication that the enterprise, provided that its marketing 
strategy is successful, can use to raise certain pictures, 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty. 
 38. Article 28(1)(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. However, see also J. Moskin, Victoria’s 
Big Secret: Whither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution Act?, 93 TMR 842, 856-857 (2004), 
who insists on “a property right similar to copyright or patent.” 
 39. According to international standards, the existence of a likelihood of confusion shall 
be presumed only in double identity cases where a sign identical to the trademark is used 
for identical goods or services. See Article 16(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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associations, and expectations in the minds of consumers. Through 
investment in advertising, an enterprise can educate consumers to 
associate a particular lifestyle or attitude with the trademark.40 
The process of adding these additional meanings to the trademark 
can result in the creation of a valuable brand image.41  
The free “independent” meaning that the sign may have had 
prior to the acquisition of trademark rights, however, may be 
blurred by these marketing efforts. When, for instance, a sign of 
cultural significance is appropriated as a trademark, the sign’s 
original cultural meaning may gradually be superseded by 
commercial messages conveyed by the trademark owner. Even 
though use of the sign for private, educational, and cultural 
purposes does not necessarily fall within the scope of exclusive 
trademark rights, these forms of use outside the context of trade 
may still be influenced by the commercial meanings and 
connotations attached to the sign by the trademark owner.42 In the 
case of a sign of cultural significance enjoying cumulative 
copyright and trademark protection, for instance, trademark rights 
that are renewed after the expiry of copyright protection may 
influence the perception and use of the sign in a cultural context. 
Even though no longer protected under copyright laws, the sign, 
therefore, does not fall into the public domain in its entirety. 
Moreover, in the case of well-known marks, trademark law 
provides for additional protection through dilution laws directed at 
third-party use of the mark on unrelated goods and services.43 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Cf. B. Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2020, 
2025-2026 (2005); J. Griffiths, Law-and-Economic Perspective on Trade Marks, in Trade 
Marks and Brands—An Interdisciplinary Critique 241, 255 (L. Bently & J. Davis & J.C. 
Ginsburg eds., Cambridge University Press 2008); R.S. Brown, Advertising and the Public 
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 Yale L.J. 1619,1620 (1999); K.H. Fezer, 
Entwicklungslinien und Prinzipien des Markenrechts in Europa— Auf dem Weg zur Marke 
als einem immaterialgüterrechtlichen Kommunikationszeichen, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz 
und Urheberrecht 457, 461-462 (2003); S. Casparie-Kerdel, Dilution Disguised: Has the 
Concept of Trade Mark Dilution Made its Way into the Laws of Europe?, 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. 
Rev. 185, 185-186) (2001); Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 397-399; M. Lehmann, Die 
wettbewerbswidrige Ausnutzung und Beeinträchtigung des guten Rufs bekannter Marken, 
Namen und HerkunftsangabenDie Rechtslage in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International 6,14-17 (1986). 
 41. See J.E. Schroeder, Brand Culture: Trade marks, Marketing and Consumption, in 
Trade Marks and Brands—An Interdisciplinary Critique 161 (L. Bently & J. Davis & J.C. 
Ginsburg eds., Cambridge University Press 2008). 
 42. See the literature references supra note 6. 
 43. Cf. Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, see Article 4(b)(ii) and (iii) 
WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known 
Marks, WIPO Publication No. 833, Geneva 2000, available at http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/development_iplaw/. For commentary, see N. Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of 
Trademarks and Designs 343-382 (Austin/Boston/Chicago/New York: Wolters Kluwer 2011); 
D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 274-279 (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 3d ed. 2008); C.M. Correa, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement 188-193 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2007); A. Kur, TRIPs and Trademark Law, in From GATT to TRIPs—The Agreement on 
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Depending on the scope of the protection of well-known marks 
against dilution in national law, the trademark owner may be able 
to preclude unauthorized use of the protected sign in a manner 
that harms the highly distinctive character (blurring) or the 
reputation of the well-known mark (tarnishment), or unfairly 
exploits the mark’s distinctiveness or reputation (unfair free-
riding).44 Anti-dilution protection of this type is not limited to the 
goods or services for which the trademark is registered. A showing 
of likely confusion is not a prerequisite to a successful dilution 
claim. The requirement of use as a trademark—in the sense that 
the allegedly dilutive use must be perceived as an indication of 
commercial source by consumers—may be relaxed as well. 
 In national systems providing for broad anti-dilution 
protection, concerns have been raised about adverse effects on 
freedom of expression.45 Culturally and socially valuable forms of 
use, such as use for the purposes of news reporting, criticism, 
review, and parody, may be found to fall within the ambit of 
protection against dilution. As a result, trademarks that have 
become metaphors with complex meanings—not least because of 
contributions of the consuming public46—may become unavailable 
for social and cultural discourse. 
The impact of trademark rights on the public domain thus 
depends on the different layers of trademark protection. The 
acquisition of trademark rights does not afford the trademark 
owner unlimited control over the use of the protected sign. The 
various infringement criteria, ranging from use in the course of 
                                                                                                                 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 93, 107-108 (F.K. Beier/G. Schricker 
eds., Weinheim 1996); A. Kur, Die WIPO-Vorschläge zum Schutz bekannter und berühmter 
Marken Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 866 (1999). With regard to the 
question whether Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement sets forth an obligation to adopt 
anti-dilution legislation at the national level, see particularly M. Handler, Trademark 
Dilution in Australia?, 29 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 307 (2007). 
 44. Cf. the overview given by I. Simon Fhima, The Actual Dilution Requirement in the 
United States, United Kingdom and European Union: A Comparative Analysis, 12 B.U. J. 
Sci. & Tech. L. 271 (2006); M.R.F. Senftleben, The Trademark Tower of Babel—Dilution 
Concepts in International, US and EC Law, Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 40, 45 
(2009); J.T. McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States Law 
Compared, 94 TMR 1163 (2004); K.H. Fezer, Entwicklungslinien und Prinzipien des 
Markenrechts in Europa—Auf dem Weg zur Marke als einem immaterialgüterrechtlichen 
Kommunikationszeichen, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 457, 464, 467 
(2003); S. Casparie-Kerdel, Dilution Disguised: Has the Concept of Trade Mark Dilution 
Made its Way into the Laws of Europe?, 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 185, 188 (2001); R.S. 
Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 Yale L.J. 
1619, 1620 (1999); B. Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1143, 1146-1147, 1174 (2006); G.B. Dinwoodie & 
M.D. Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 98 
(2006). As to the foundations of the dilution doctrine, see F.I. Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1927). 
 45. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 405-407 and the literature references supra note 10. 
 46. See the literature references supra note 11. 
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trade to a likelihood of confusion or dilution, constitute inherent 
limits of trademark rights. Because of these inherent limits, 
protection against confusion may leave noncommercial use for 
private, cultural, religious, educational, or political purposes 
largely unaffected. Anti-dilution provisions for well-known marks, 
however, may give the trademark owner more general control over 
the use of the trademark, which can interfere with socially and 
culturally valuable use, such as use for news reporting, criticism, 
review, and parody. 
2. Limited Exceptions 
In addition to the outlined inherent limits of exclusive rights, 
trademark law offers room for exceptions that exempt certain 
forms of use from the control of the trademark owner and serve as 
defenses in infringement cases. At the international level, 
Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO members to: 
. . . provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a 
trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that 
such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the 
owner of the trademark and of third parties. 
This international basis for the introduction of defenses at the 
national level has been interpreted in the framework of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement in the case EC—
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.47 Interpreting the 
requirement of “limited exceptions,” the WTO Panel embarked on 
the measurement of the extent to which a curtailment of exclusive 
trademark rights resulted from EC legislation requiring prior 
trademarks, in specific circumstances, to coexist with later 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ¶¶ 7.650-7.651, based on a complaint by the 
United States and the twin report WTO Document WT/DS290/R dealing with a parallel 
complaint by Australia. As to the interpretation of Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
reports are identical in substance. Following references concern the report on the U.S. 
complaint. For comments on the WTO panel reports in the area of exceptions to intellectual 
property rights, see L.P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect 
Trademarks, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 405, 436-443 (2010); M.R.F. Senftleben, Towards a 
Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights?—WTO Panel Reports Shed 
Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark 
Law, 37 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. , p. 407 (2006); M. Ficsor, How Much of 
What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement 
Cases, 192 Revue internationale du droit d’auteur 111 (2002); J. Oliver, Copyright in the 
WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test, 25 Colum. J.L. & Arts 119 (2002); D.J. 
Brennan, The Three-Step Test Frenzy—Why the TRIPS Panel Decision might be considered 
Per Incuriam, Intell. Prop. Q. 213 (2002); J. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright 
Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, Revue 
internationale du droit d’auteur 13 (2001); P.B. Hugenholtz, De wettelijke beperkingen 
beperkt. De WTO geeft de driestappentoets tanden, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en 
informatierecht 197 (2000). 
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geographical indications.48 Referring to the fair use example given 
in Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement itself, the WTO Panel noted 
that fair use of descriptive terms was not limited in terms of the 
number of third parties who may benefit from the limited 
exception, nor in terms of the quantity of goods or services 
exempted under the limited exception.49 Against this background, 
the panel held that the EC coexistence regime kept within these 
conceptual contours and could pass the limited exceptions test.50  
With regard to the remaining “legitimate interests” test of 
Article 17, the WTO Panel lent weight to the fact that the 
prohibition of an unreasonable prejudice to be found in 
corresponding tests in Articles 13 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement 
had been omitted in the trademark provision. The panel inferred 
from this omission “a lesser standard of regard for the legitimate 
interests of the owner of the trademark.”51 However, every 
trademark owner had a legitimate interest in preserving the 
distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of her trademark.52 In 
addition, consumers had a legitimate interest in being able to 
distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of 
another, and to avoid confusion.53 The EC coexistence regime 
allowed the refusal of the registration of a geographical indication 
in light of the reputation and renown of a prior trademark, and the 
length of time that a prior trademark had been used. Moreover, it 
addressed consumers by providing for the refusal of the 
registration of a geographical indication where the registration 
was liable to mislead consumers as to the true identity of the 
product. For these reasons, the panel was satisfied that the 
legitimate interests of the trademark owner and consumers had 
been taken into account.54 International trademark law, therefore, 
offers breathing space for the adoption of exceptions to exclusive 
trademark rights. This additional flexibility can be used to exempt 
forms of use that are deemed particularly important for other 
traders or the public at large. 
C. Public Domain in Relation to Trademark Law 
In sum, an analysis of trademark law on the basis of different 
conceptions of the public domain—the legal status approach and 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Doubts as to the adoption of this interpretation in a trademark context are raised 
by C.M. Correa, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on 
the TRIPS Agreement 194 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007). 
 49. See WTO Panel—Trademarks, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ¶ 7.654. 
 50. See WTO Panel—Trademarks, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ¶ 7.659. 
 51. See WTO Panel—Trademarks, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ¶ 7.671. 
 52. See WTO Panel—Trademarks, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ¶ 7.664. 
 53. See WTO Panel—Trademarks, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ¶ 7.676. 
 54. See WTO Panel—Trademarks, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ¶¶ 7.666 & 7.677. 
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the freedom of use approach—leads to divergent results. 
Trademark law scores relatively low in terms of preservation of the 
public domain when the analysis is confined to material that is 
unencumbered by intellectual property rights. With no clear 
temporal limit of protection, trademark law fails to contribute to 
the constant enrichment of the public domain. Moreover, 
exclusions from protection based on the requirement of 
distinctiveness may be overcome through use in trade. Besides the 
absence of a definitive expiry of protection, the central criterion for 
obtaining protection is thus elastic. From the perspective of a legal 
status approach, trademark protection may be understood to make 
broader inroads into the public domain than other protection 
regimes with a different configuration, such as copyright and 
patent law.55 
However, trademark law may score relatively high when the 
public domain is understood to encompass user freedoms that 
remain after the acquisition of protection. Because of several 
inherent limits—the confinement to specific goods and services, 
use in the course of trade, use as a trademark and use likely to 
cause confusion—the exclusive rights attendant to trademark 
ownership may have a narrower ambit than the exclusive rights 
conferred on a copyright or patent owner. The impact of protection 
on the freedom to use protected material seems more limited than 
the impact of protection in several other fields of intellectual 
property law. This is true at least with regard to trademark 
systems that refrain from expanding protection against dilution to 
such an extent that trademark rights come close to the scope of the 
exploitation rights granted in copyright or patent law.56  
                                                                                                                 
 55. However, see also the critical comments on the elasticity of eligibility criteria in the 
area of copyright and patent protection by G.J. Maier/R.C. Mattson, State Street Bank ist 
kein Ausreißer: Die Geschichte der Softwarepatentierung im US-amerikanischen Recht, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht—Internationaler Teil 677 (2001); R.P. 
Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business 
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577 (1999); L.L. Weinreb, 
Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1150 (1998); S.E. Gordon, The Very 
Idea! Why Copyright is an Inappropriate Way to Protect Computer Programs, Eur. Intell. 
Prop. Rev. 10 (1998); A.A. Quaedvlieg, Auteursrecht op techniek (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink 
1987); A. Dietz, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Trojan Horse or Stimulus for 
the Future Copyright System?, 110 Archiv für Urheber-, Film-, Funk- und Theaterrecht 57 
(1985). 
 56. With regard to this tendency in advanced trademark systems, see Senftleben, supra 
note 43, at 45; J. Moskin, Victoria’s Big Secret: Whither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution 
Act?, 93 TMR 842 (2004); K.-H. Fezer, Entwicklungslinien und Prinzipien des Markenrechts 
in Europa—Auf dem Weg zur Marke als einem immaterialgüterrechtlichen 
Kommunikationszeichen, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 457 (2003); F. 
Pollaud-Dulian, Marques de renommée— Histoire de la dénaturation d’un concept, 
Propriétés intellectuelles 43 (2001); Strasser, supra note 15, at 375; R.S. Brown, Advertising 
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 Yale L.J. 1619 (1999); 
Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 397. 
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Considering this mixed result (a low score from a legal status 
perspective, a potentially high score from a freedom of use 
perspective), both approaches must be factored into the equation. 
Otherwise, the analysis will be incomplete and imbalanced. In 
particular, measures taken to keep the expressive dimension of 
protected trademarks in the public domain would be overlooked in 
an analysis focusing exclusively on signs that are unencumbered 
by trademark rights.  
In light of current international initiatives, a synthetic 
approach combining legal status and freedom of use perspectives 
also makes sense. It broadens the debate: besides a choice between 
black and white (public domain preservation in the case of 
excluded signs, encroachment upon the public domain in the case 
of protected signs), the inclusion of user freedoms following from 
inherent limits of exclusive rights and the adoption of exceptions 
allows the consideration of shades of gray (public domain 
preservation to a certain extent in the case of protected signs that 
remain usable in several respects). A synthetic approach thus adds 
flexibility by asking whether limitations on the scope of protection 
can be sufficient to strike a proper balance between the need to 
preserve the public domain and the interests served by trademark 
protection. This offers additional room for achieving consensus at 
the international level. 
The public domain can therefore be understood to encompass 
in a trademark context all signs that are not currently protected as 
trademarks and all uses of protected signs that fall outside the 
scope of the exclusive rights of the trademark owner. This notion 
includes, in particular, 
1. all signs that are generally excluded from trademark 
protection regardless of whether they are distinctive or not 
(unconditional exclusion); 
2. all signs that do not satisfy the basic protection 
requirement of distinctiveness (conditional exclusion that 
can be overcome by showing distinctiveness acquired 
through use in trade); 
3. all forms of use that cannot be controlled by the trademark 
owner because of inherent limits of exclusive rights 
(implicit freedom of use in the sense that it is derived from 
the definition of exclusive rights); and 
4. all forms of use that cannot be controlled by the trademark 
owner because of the adoption of limited exceptions (explicit 
freedom of use in the sense that it follows from provisions 
specifically setting forth defenses against alleged 
infringement). 
This synthetic conception of the public domain reflects 
preservation mechanisms that differ in degree of effectiveness. An 
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unconditional exclusion from protection ensures that the signs 
concerned cannot be removed from the public domain through the 
acquisition of trademark rights. By contrast, ineligibility for 
trademark protection as a result of a lack of distinctiveness is less 
absolute. The moment the obstacle to the acquisition of trademark 
protection is overcome through use in trade, the sign concerned 
will be removed from the public domain to the extent to which 
trademark protection is provided (conditional exclusion).  
Similarly, forms of using protected signs may explicitly be 
exempted from the control of the trademark owner on the basis of 
a limited exception that provides a defense in infringement cases. 
User freedoms that are implicitly derived from inherent limits of 
trademark rights, by contrast, will become less reliable safeguards 
with every expansion of protection, in particular in the area of 
protection against dilution. In a national trademark system that 
provides only for traditional protection against confusion, the 
inherent limits of exclusive rights—the confinement to specific 
goods and services, use in the course of trade, use as a trademark, 
and use likely to cause confusion—can function as effective 
safeguards that exempt references to the protected mark in 
nonconfusing contexts from the control of the trademark owner. In 
a national system offering broad protection against dilution, the 
aforementioned inherent limits are likely to lose that safeguarding 
function to a large extent. 
However, neither inherent limits nor explicit exceptions 
preclude the acquisition of trademark rights. It must therefore be 
considered that the trademark owner, as a result of the grant of 
protection, will be able to influence or even dictate the 
communication process surrounding the protected sign. 
Commercial connotations may be added to the sign that reduce its 
value for otherwise privileged forms of use, such as use for cultural 
or religious purposes. Hence, there is a qualitative difference 
between inherent limits of exclusive rights and limited exceptions 
on the one hand, and exclusions from protection on the other. An 
effective exclusion keeps signs free from trademark protection and 
does not provide an incentive for the attachment of marketing 
messages. This incentive does exist, however, when trademark 
protection is granted. Inherent limits of, and limited exceptions to, 
the exclusive rights of trademark owners are thus inadequate tools 
for the preservation of signs as part of an information commons 
that can freely be shaped and defined in the course of an open 
communication process. The contribution of these legal 
mechanisms to the preservation of the public domain is limited in 
comparison with an effective exclusion from trademark protection. 
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III. PUBLIC DOMAIN PRESERVATION IN THE EU 
In the EU, trademark law is harmonized to a large extent. 
Trademark legislation and office practices in EU Member States 
have to keep within the harmonized legal framework set forth in 
the EU Trademark Directive57 (TMD). Additionally, the EU 
Community Trade Mark Regulation58 (CTMR) provides for a 
unitary Community Trade Mark (CTM) that has equal effect 
throughout the EU. As the CTMR is in line with the earlier 
Directive, the two legislative instruments constitute a robust body 
of harmonized EU trademark law. The harmonizing effect is 
enhanced by the fact that national courts have to refer questions 
relating to the application and interpretation of EU trademark law 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Court’s 
decisions are binding for national courts.59 The introduction of the 
CTM, moreover, led to the establishment of an EU institution 
complementing the trademark offices of EU Member States. CTMs 
are registered by the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market (OHIM). 
Given these common standards governing trademark law and 
practice in the EU, the following analysis of public domain 
preservation in the EU can be based predominantly on the rules 
following from the TMD and the CTMR, and the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU.60 Nonetheless, examples of national or regional office 
practices and court decisions are added where this is appropriate 
to illustrate the effect of EU trademark law in national contexts. 
Moreover, the proposal of the European Commission for amending 
EU trademark legislation will be taken into account to shed light 
on areas where the EU itself sees a need for changes.61 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 22, 
2008, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (codified 
version) (O.J. 2008 L 299, p. 25), which entered into force on November 28, 2008, and 
repealed the earlier Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council of December 21, 1988. 
 58. Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 of February 26, 2009 (codified version) (O.J. 
2009 L 78, p. 1) on the Community Trade Mark, which entered into force on April 13, 2009, 
and repealed the earlier Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of December 20, 1993. 
 59. With regard to the impact of the CJEU on the harmonization of law in the EU, see 
the comparative analysis by K.J. Alter & L.R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial 
Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 Int’l 
Org. 563 (2010). 
 60. The CJEU decisions referred to in this article are available online at 
http://www.curia.eu. 
 61. EU Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, March 27, 
2013, Document COM (2013) 162 final, 2013/0089 (COD), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/tm/. For the preparatory in-depth analysis of 
EU trademark law underlying the Proposal, see Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trade 
Mark System (Munich: Max Planck Institute 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/indprop/tm/index_en.htm. 
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The analysis will be structured in accordance with the 
preservation mechanisms identified in Part II. In fact, EU 
trademark law offers mechanisms that may be employed to 
safeguard the public domain in all above-described categories: 
unconditional exclusions from protection and exclusions 
conditional on a lack of distinctiveness (see Part III.A below), as 
well as implicit freedom of use that can be derived from inherent 
limits of protection and explicit freedom of use flowing from the 
adoption of exceptions that can serve as defenses (see Part III.B 
below). 
A. Limitations or Exclusions from 
Trademark Protectability 
In the EU, trademark rights may be acquired with regard to 
any signs capable of being represented graphically, 
particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, 
numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided 
that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings.62 
This definition leaves room for the extension of trademark 
protection to various nontraditional types of marks, the only 
limitations being that they can be represented graphically and can 
distinguish a party’s goods or services.63 Registrable signs include 
single colors64 and sounds.65 The recognition of these new types of 
marks enhances the need for safeguarding the public domain. With 
the recognition of shape marks, trademark rights may be acquired 
with regard to industrial or artistic designs that would otherwise 
belong to the public domain after the expiry of industrial design or 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Article 2 of the TMD and Article 4 of the CTMR. 
 63. With regard to the trend of recognizing more and more nontraditional types of 
marks in the EU, see I. Lewalter & P.T. Schrader, Die Fühlmarke, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 476 (2005); F. Hauck, Aktuelle Entwicklungen bei der 
Eintragung von Farbmarken, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 363 (2005); A. 
Kur, Alles oder Nichts im Formmarkenschutz?, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht—International Teil 755 (2004); A. Bouvel, Qu’importe le flacon . . . Le droit 
des marques malmené par les emballages, Propriétés Intellectuelles 863 (2004); R. Arnet, 
Markenschutz für Formen, sic! 829 (2004); J. Pagenberg, Trade Dress and the Three-
Dimensional Marks—The Neglected Children of Trademark Law?, 35 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. 
& Competition L. 831 (2004); M. Bölling, Der EuGH und die abstrakte Farbmarke—Von der 
bewussten Entwertung einer Markenform, Markenrecht 384 (2004); S. Bingener, Das Wesen 
der Positionsmarke oder Wo die Positionsmarke hingehört, Markenrecht 377 (2004); A. Firth 
& E. Gredley & S.M. Maniatis, Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy, Functional 
Considerations and Consumer Perception, Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 86 (2001). 
 64. See CJEU, judgment of May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep/Benelux-
Merkenbureau. 
 65. See CJEU, judgment of November 27, 2003, Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV/Joost 
Kist h.o.d.n. Memex. 
Vol. 103 TMR 797 
copyright protection. With the recognition of sound marks, 
melodies having cultural significance may be removed from the 
public domain.  
Additional kinds of nontraditional trademarks may be 
recognized in the future. The proposal for amendments to EU 
trademark legislation made by the European Commission seeks to 
replace the requirement of graphical representation with a more 
flexible standard of sufficiently precise representation.66 Given this 
flexible approach to the eligibility of signs for trademark 
protection, it is of particular interest to study the scope of 
exclusions that can serve as a means of preserving the public 
domain (see Part III.A.1 below). Moreover, the question arises 
whether the exclusions of signs in EU trademark law can be 
overcome through use in trade (see Part III.A.2 below). 
1. Scope of Exclusions 
EU trademark law contains several absolute grounds for 
refusal that exclude signs from trademark registration because 
they must remain available for the public or for other traders. The 
public domain dimension has been recognized explicitly by the 
CJEU. In the decision Windsurfing Chiemsee, the Court explained 
that absolute grounds for refusal concerning descriptive signs 
served the public interest, namely that 
descriptive signs or indications relating to the categories of 
goods or services in respect of which registration is applied for 
may be freely used by all, including as collective marks or as 
part of complex or graphic marks.67  
The CJEU acknowledged the public domain dimension also with 
regard to absolute grounds for refusal relating to shape marks.68 In 
Philips/Remington, the CJEU explained that the rationale 
underlying the ground for refusal relating to shapes necessary to 
obtain a technical result was to prevent the extension of monopoly 
rights relating to technical solutions and enhance competition with 
regard to functional product characteristics.69 The Court added 
that the refusal of registration pursued an aim that was in the 
public interest, “namely that a shape whose essential 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See Article 3(1)(b) of the TMD amendment proposal, EU Commission, supra note 
60, requiring that the trademark be “represented in a manner which enables the competent 
authorities and the public to determine the precise subject of the protection afforded to its 
proprietor.” 
 67. See CJEU, judgment of May 4, 1999, Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing 
Chiemsee, ¶ 25. 
 68. See Article 3(1)(e) of the TMD and Article 7(1)(e) of the CTMR. 
 69. See CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99, Philips/Remington, ¶ 78. 
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characteristics perform a technical function and were chosen to 
fulfil that function may be freely used by all.”70 
Given the recognized need to keep descriptive signs and 
functional shapes available, the Court delineates the scope of the 
respective absolute grounds for refusal rather broadly. In 
Windsurfing Chiemsee, it held that, for the registration of a 
geographical name to be prohibited, it was not necessary to give 
evidence of a real, current, or serious need to leave the indication 
free. By contrast, it was sufficient that the geographical name was 
liable to be used as an indication of geographical origin with 
regard to a certain category of goods or services in the future.71  
In respect of shapes necessary to obtain a technical result, the 
Court specified in Lego/Mega Brands that the ground for refusal 
could not be overcome by merely establishing that competitors 
could use alternative shapes to achieve the same technical result. 
The absolute ground for refusal applied irrespective of whether the 
shape at issue was the only one capable of obtaining the required 
technical result, or whether there were several shapes that were 
equivalent from a functional point of view.72 Similarly, the 
absolute ground for refusal concerning shapes that give 
substantial value to the goods applies not only when the value of a 
given shape is due to its inherent beauty and attractiveness.73 It 
also covers shapes that acquired attractiveness as a result of 
advertising campaigns presenting the shape as a distinctive sign 
with a particular brand image.74 
In the area of official signs and emblems,75 EU Member States 
are free to adopt an absolute ground for refusal referring to 
badges, emblems, and escutcheons that are of public interest but 
not covered by Article 6ter of the Paris Convention.76 In addition, 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See id., ¶ 80. 
 71. See CJEU, judgment of May 4, 1999, Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing 
Chiemsee, ¶¶ 35-37. 
 72. See CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2002, case C-299/99, Philips/Remington, ¶¶ 81-83; 
judgment of September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 P, Lego/Mega Brands, ¶¶ 53-58.  
 73. With regard to the exclusion from trademark registration in such cases, see 
Judgment of the General Court of the European Union, October 6, 2011, Case T-508/08, 
Bang & Olufsen/OHIM, ¶¶ 74-79. 
 74. See CJEU, judgment of September 20, 2007, Case C-371/06, Benetton/G-Star, ¶ 28. 
 75. See Article 3(1)(h) of the TMD and Article 7(1)(h) of the CTMR. As to the scope of 
this absolute grounds for refusal, see CJEU, judgment of July 16, 2009, Cases C-202/08 P 
and 208/08 P, American Clothing Associates/OHIM, ¶¶ 47 & 80. 
 76. See Article 3(2)(c) of the TMD. It may be invoked with regard to the official 
emblems of lower public entities, such as provinces and municipalities, and other public 
institutions, such as the police and the fire brigade. See, e.g., § 8(2) No. 6 of the Trademark 
Law of Germany; Article 5 of the Trademark Law of Malta, Article 131(2)(ii) of the 
Trademark Law of Poland, Article 238(4)(a) of the Industrial Property Code of Portugal, 
Article 5(1)(i) and (k) of the Trademark Law of Spain. These laws are available online at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en. The additional ground for refusal is also applied at CTM 
level. See Article 7(1)(i) of the CTMR. 
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EU Member States enjoy the freedom of excluding from 
registration signs of high symbolic value, in particular religious 
symbols.77 This further ground for refusal may be understood to 
cover not only signs with a religious meaning, such as holy names, 
pictures, and icons, but also signs that, in light of a country’s 
history and cultural traditions, are perceived as national symbols 
even though they do not constitute official state emblems. This 
may include historical and cultural monuments.78 EU Member 
States that adopted this optional ground for refusal include 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, 
Portugal, and Slovakia.79 In other EU Member States, official 
emblems and signs of high symbolic value may be excluded from 
registration on the grounds that they are deceptive80 or contrary to 
public policy or accepted principles of morality.81  
With regard to signs having cultural significance but no high 
symbolic value, however, EU trademark law does not provide for 
specific grounds for refusal. Discussing the requirements for 
registering the first nine notes of the piano piece Für Elise in 
Shield Mark/Kist, Advocate General Colomer expressed the view 
that it was difficult to accept  
that a creation of the mind, which forms part of the universal 
cultural heritage, should be appropriated indefinitely by a 
person to be used on the market in order to distinguish the 
goods he produces or the services he provides with an 
exclusivity which not even its author’s estate enjoys.82  
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Article 3(2)(b) of the TMD. 
 78. See, e.g., Article 11(1), sub 11, of the Trademark Law of Bulgaria referring to 
“marks which consist of or include the name or a representation of historical and cultural 
monuments of the Republic of Bulgaria, as specified by the Ministry of Culture.” 
 79. See Article 11(1), sub 11, of the Trademark Act of Bulgaria, § 2(1)(i) Act on 
Trademarks of the Czech Republic, Article 3(2)(a) of the Trademark Act of Greece, Article 
3(2)(c) of the Trademark Law of Hungary, Article 10 of the Trademark Law of Italy, Article 
6(1), sub 9, of the Trademark Law of Latvia, Article 131(2)(v) of the Trademark Law of 
Poland, Article 238(4)(b) of the Industrial Property Code of Portugal, § 5(1)(j) of the 
Trademarks Act of Slovakia. These laws are available online at http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en. 
 80. See Article 3(1)(g) of the TMD and Article 7(1)(g) of the CTMR. The public may be 
misled to believe that the applicant has a connection with the public institution concerned.  
 81. See Article 3(1)(f) of the TMD and Article 7(1)(f) of the CTMR. This latter option 
may be applied to religious symbols. See, e.g., German Federal Patent Court, Nov. 2, 1993, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 377 (1994). In this decision, the German 
Federal Patent Court denied registration of the word mark “Messias” as a trademark for 
clothing, shoes and hats because of a conflict with morality and public order. However, the 
denial of registration on this basis seems less likely in the case of historical personages. See 
Dutch Supreme Court, judgment of October 28, 1948, published in Bijblad bij de industriële 
eigendom, 1949, p. 24. In this decision, the Dutch Supreme rejected the argument that 
registration of the name “Winston Churchill” as a trademark for cigars was contrary to 
morality or public order. 
 82. See Opinion of Advocate General Colomer of April 3, 2003, in Case C-283/01, Shield 
Mark/Kist, ¶ 52. 
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The CJEU, however, did not invoke this argument to exclude 
the first nine notes of Für Elise from trademark registration, 
instead paving the way for registration of melodies by holding that 
the requirement of graphical representation could be satisfied by 
providing standard musical notation.83 Cultural significance as 
such, therefore, does not constitute an obstacle to registration. The 
particular recognition and popularity that a sign in the public 
domain enjoys does not hinder its appropriation as a trademark.84  
National court decisions confirm that cultural significance 
does not necessarily preempt registrability. The German Federal 
Patent Court, for instance, rejected an argument that registration 
of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa was contrary to public policy or 
accepted principles of morality, holding that appropriation of the 
Mona Lisa on the basis of trademark law would not violate the 
principle that cultural expressions should remain freely available 
for the public after the expiry of copyright protection.85 
Nevertheless, the court denied registration, holding that the 
applicant had failed to establish the requisite distinctiveness. As 
the painting was frequently used by third parties in advertising, 
the court held that the public would regard the Mona Lisa as a 
mere advertising instrument rather than as a unique indication of 
source. The court also held that, because of the frequent use in 
advertising, the painting had become customary in established 
trade practices.86 
In cases of “cultural heritage grabbing,” the registration of a 
sign of cultural significance may still be denied or invalidated 
because the application was made in bad faith. Such a case may 
arise where the applicant registers a sign of cultural significance 
without intending to make genuine use of the sign in trade. 
Instead, the applicant aims at exploiting the popularity of the 
cultural sign by using the registration as a vehicle to impose an 
obligation on other traders to obtain licenses for its use. The CJEU 
developed several factors that are relevant to the identification of 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See CJEU, judgment of November 27, 2003, Case C-283/01, Shield Mark/Kist. 
 84. See also Dutch Supreme Court, judgment of March 5, 1999, Case no. 16812, 
C97/291, published in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2000, no. 306, ¶ 3.6. Instead of a cultural 
heritage sign, this decision concerned the sign “Route 66.” 
 85. See German Federal Patent Court, November 25, 1997, Case 24 W (pat) 188/96, 
Mona Lisa, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1021, 1023 (1998).  
 86. Id. at 1022-1023. For case comments, see Senftleben, supra note 6, at 102-104; 
Assaf, supra note 6, at 5; A. Ohly, Von einem Indianerhäuptling, einer Himmelsscheibe, 
einer Jeans und dem Lächeln der Mona Lisa—Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen 
Urheber- und Kennzeichenrecht, in Grundlagen und Grundfragen des Geistigen Eigentums, 
Festgabe für Diethelm Klippel zum 65 203 (L. Pahlow & J. Eisfeld eds., Geburtstag, 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008); F. Klinkert & F. Schwab, Markenrechtlicher Raubbau an 
gemeinfreien Werken—ein richtungsweisendes “Machtwort durch den Mona Lisa-Beschluss 
des Bundespatentgerichts?, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1067 (1999); W. 
Nordemann, Mona Lisa als Marke, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 389 (1997).  
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bad faith applications. In particular, it may be relevant that the 
applicant knows or must know that a third party is using a sign 
identical or similar to the sign for which registration is sought, and 
that the applicant intends to prevent that third party from 
continuing to use the sign.87 
2. Effectiveness of Exclusions for Preservation 
of Public Domain 
When assessing the contribution of these grounds for refusal 
to the preservation of the public domain, a fundamental difference 
between the provisions in EU trademark law must be taken into 
account: whereas the grounds for refusal relating to functional 
shapes cannot be overcome by showing that a shape has acquired 
distinctiveness as a result of use in trade (unconditional 
exclusion),88 the grounds for refusal relating to nondistinctive, 
descriptive, and generic signs no longer apply when a sign of this 
nature has become distinctive because of the use made of it in 
trade (conditional exclusion).89 
In the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the conditional exclusion 
based on a lack of distinctiveness serves as the primary safeguard 
against the acquisition of trademark rights for nontraditional 
signs that should remain free for other traders or the public at 
large. In the decision Henkel, the Court pointed out that average 
consumers were not “in the habit of making assumptions about the 
origin of goods based on the shape of their packaging, in the 
absence of any graphic or word element.”90  
Therefore, it could prove more difficult according to the Court 
to establish distinctive character in the case of product packaging 
for which trademark protection is sought. Only a trademark that 
significantly departed from the norm or customs of the sector and 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See CJEU, judgment of June 11, 2009, Case C-529/07, Lindt/Hauswirth, ¶ 53. For a 
more detailed analysis of bad faith trademark registrations, see A. Tsoutsanis, Het 
merkdepot te kwader trouw, (Deventer: Kluwer 2005); H. Helm, Die bösgläubige 
Markenanmeldung, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 593 (1996). The 
introduction of an absolute ground for refusal with regard to bad faith applications is 
optional for EU Member States. See Article 3(2)(d) of the TMD. At the CTM level, bad faith 
constitutes an absolute ground for invalidity. See Article 52(1)(b) of the CTMR. 
 88. See Article 3(3) of the TMD and Article 7(3) of the CTMR. See also CJEU, judgment 
of June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99, Philips/Remington, ¶ 57; judgment of September 20, 2007, 
Case C-371/06, Benetton/G-Star, ¶¶ 25-27; judgment of September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 
P, Lego/Mega Brands, ¶ 47: “I[t] follows, therefore, from Article 7(3) of the regulation that, 
even if a shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result has become 
distinctive in consequence of the use which has been made of it, it is prohibited from being 
registered as a trade mark.” 
 89. As to the factors that will be considered in this context, see CJEU, judgment of May 
4, 1999, Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee, ¶ 51. As to the territorial 
reach, see CJEU, judgment of September 7, 2006, Case C-108/05, Europolis, ¶ 28. 
 90. See CJEU, judgment of February 12, 2004, Case C-218/01, Henkel/DPMA, ¶ 52; 
judgment of April 8, 2003, Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde and others, ¶ 48. 
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thereby fulfilled the function of an indication of commercial origin 
was not devoid of distinctive character.91 In Libertel, the Court 
used the same line of argument with regard to color per se.92 
Distinctiveness without any prior use was inconceivable save in 
exceptional circumstances, and particularly where the number of 
goods or services for which the mark was claimed was very 
restricted and the relevant market very specific.93 
On the basis of this jurisprudence, the shape of products or 
their packaging and abstract colors are likely to be found devoid of 
distinctive character absent a showing that distinctive character 
has been acquired through use in trade. This additional hurdle can 
be regarded as the result of an effort made by the CJEU to 
safeguard the public domain.94 In Libertel, the Court acknowledged 
that there was “a public interest in not unduly restricting the 
availability of colours for the other operators who offer for sale 
goods or services of the same type as those in respect of which 
registration is sought.”95 
It remains to be seen whether this effort to keep certain 
nontraditional signs available is sufficient. The CJEU’s holdings 
related to the nondistinctiveness of product packaging or color per 
se may actually be counterproductive to the general intents to 
preserve free use of these signs by encouraging merchants to 
invest in marketing efforts that aim to educate consumers to see 
such product or packaging features as source identifiers. The more 
often the public is confronted with a shape mark or abstract color 
mark, the more alert it will be to the fact that, besides standard 
word and figurative marks, shapes and color per se may also 
indicate the commercial source of goods and services. As a result, 
the CJEU may have to revise its own assumptions about the 
distinctiveness of shapes and color per se in the near future. 
Arguably, the assumption of consumers not being “in the habit” of 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See CJEU, judgment of February 12, 2004, Case C-218/01, Henkel/DPMA, ¶ 49. 
 92. See CJEU, judgment of May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep/Benelux-
Merkenbureau, ¶ 65. 
 93. Id. ¶ 66. 
 94. The hurdle to be surmounted, however, need not necessarily be high. For instance, 
see German Federal Court of Justice, decision of July 9, 2009, Case I ZB 88/07, ROCHER-
Kugel, published in Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 138, ¶ 43 (2010), 
available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de: “In the case of a shape mark having 
characteristics that depart from the basic shape of the type of goods concerned, there is, as a 
general rule, no reason to assume that the threshold for acquiring distinctive character is 
particularly high.” Accordingly, the fact that 62 percent of the relevant public recognized the 
shape mark was deemed sufficient. With regard to color per se, the German Federal Patent 
Court held that, in a small market segment, a recognition of the color mark by 50 percent of 
the relevant public is sufficient in light of a considerable market share of the applicant on 
that particular market. See decision of December 9, 2008, Case 33 W (pat) 57/07, published 
in Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 71 (2010). 
 95. CJEU, judgment of May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep/Benelux-
Merkenbureau, ¶ 55. 
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perceiving signs of this type as a badge of origin becomes more and 
more doubtful with every trader who succeeds in linking a specific 
shape or color with her enterprise as the origin of goods or services 
in the minds of consumers.96 
A similar problem arises in respect of signs of cultural 
significance. The name and portrait of a famous artist, for 
instance, can be protected as a trademark in the EU.97 An attempt 
to create a solid basis for the exclusion of such portraits from 
trademark protection has been made by the German Federal 
Patent Court in a case concerning the registration of a portrait 
photograph of the actress Marlene Dietrich. The Court did not 
content itself with the exclusion of trademark protection on the 
grounds that the photograph was devoid of distinctive character. 
This solution would have meant that the exclusion could be 
surmounted if distinctiveness is acquired through use in trade. 
Instead, the Court argued that the photograph constituted a mere 
reproduction of the goods for which registration was sought, and 
invoked the exclusion of “the shape which results from the nature 
of the goods themselves.”98 Because of its unconditional character, 
the application of this shape exclusion would have been a 
remarkable step in keeping portraits of famous persons free from 
trademark protection. In contrast to an exclusion based on a lack 
of distinctiveness, the shape exclusions in EU trademark law, as 
pointed out above, cannot be overcome through use in trade.  
In contrast to the Federal Patent Court, however, the German 
Federal Court of Justice saw no need to apply shape exclusions in 
this context.99 Overruling the Patent Court’s decision, the Federal 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Given the widespread recognition of MILKA LILAC (CTM registration 000031336 
of October 27, 1999 (Kraft Foods)) and DEUTSCHE TELEKOM MAGENTA (CTM 
registration 000212787 of August 3, 2000 (Deutsche Telekom)) as abstract color marks in 
the EU, it may already be asked whether it is still correct to deny inherent distinctiveness 
in the case of eccentric colors, even though there is increased consumer awareness that color 
may serve as an indication of commercial source. UPS BROWN (CTM registration 
000962076 of September 17, 2001 (United Parcel Service)) constitutes an additional 
example indicating that an abstract color may serve as a source identifier, even if it is much 
less exceptional. 
 97. See, e.g., CTM 001081314, BEETHOVEN; CTM 000945774, DESCARTES; CTM 
001593128, ALBERT EINSTEIN; CTM 003805942, GOETHE; IR 0858800, HENRIK 
IBSEN; CTM 001358621, VINCENT VAN GOGH; CTM 005468996, MONA LISA; CTM 
000021071 MOZART; CTM 001334036, PICASSO; CTM 000119354, REMBRANDT; CTM 
004278214, SHAKESPEARE; CTM 003877354, GIUSEPPE VERDI; CTM 000047365, 
VERMEER; CTM 000996199, LEONARDO DA VINCI; CTM 003437811, ANDY WARHOL. 
For a description of the practice of granting portrait trademarks, see C. Gielen, Portretmerk: 
een non-merk? in Commercieel Portretrecht 113 (D.J.G. Visser ed., Amstelveen: deLex 
2009). 
 98. Article 3(1)(e) of the TMD. See German Federal Patent Court, November 9, 2005, 
Case 29 W (pat) 147/03, Porträtfoto Marlene Dietrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht 333, ¶ 4.2 (2006). 
 99. See German Federal Court of Justice, April 24, 2008, Case I ZB 21/06, Marlene-
Dietrich-Bildnis, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 1093, ¶ 11 (2008). 
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Court of Justice invoked the requirement of distinctiveness to 
refuse trademark protection in respect of goods and services 
concerning the work and life of the actress. The Court denied 
distinctiveness with regard to books, magazines, photographs, 
posters, CDs, DVDs, musical performances, and film productions 
on the ground that the photograph lacked the capability of 
indicating a commercial source. In respect of these goods and 
services, it would be perceived as a mere description of product 
contents.100 However, the decision left the door open to the 
possibility of the Marlene Dietrich photograph becoming 
distinctive through use in trade.101 
The Federal Court of Justice added that the portrait 
photograph was inherently distinctive with regard to 
merchandising articles, such as scarves, hats, shirts, and shoes. In 
this respect, it rejected the view expressed by the Federal Patent 
Court that consumers would perceive the portrait as a mere 
marketing tool and fail to understand that it served as an 
indication of commercial source.102 The Federal Court of Justice 
emphasized instead that the photograph did not necessarily need 
to be placed prominently on the articles. It could also be used as a 
label attached to the goods. Given this option of use as a badge of 
origin, distinctive character could not be denied.103  
B. Freedom of Use 
Besides legal instruments that can be employed to keep public 
domain material free from trademark protection, EU trademark 
law offers certain freedoms of third-party use notwithstanding that 
trademark rights may exist in a sign. This breathing space follows 
from inherent limits of protection and the adoption of exceptions 
that can be invoked as defenses in infringement cases. The 
influence of inherent limits, however, is shrinking because the 
CJEU is seemingly reluctant to apply inherent limitations—the 
requirement of use in the course of trade and use in relation to 
goods or services—as gatekeepers to set limits on the scope of 
exclusive rights from the outset (See Part III.B.1 below). Against 
this background, the development of appropriate defenses plays an 
increasingly important role (see Part III.B.2 below). 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See id. ¶¶ 12-15. 
 101. See id. ¶ 17. 
 102. See German Federal Patent Court, Nov. 9, 2005, Case 29 W (pat) 147/03, 
Porträtfoto Marlene Dietrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 333, ¶¶ 8.1 & 
8.2 (2006). 
 103. See German Federal Court of Justice, April 24, 2008, Case I ZB 21/06, Marlene-
Dietrich-Bildnis, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1093, ¶¶ 19-22 (2008). See 
also German Federal Court of Justice, March 31, 2010, Case I ZB 62/09, Marlene-Dietrich-
Bildnis II, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 825, ¶¶ 20-28 (2010). 
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1. Inherent Limits of Protection 
For trademark rights to be invoked successfully under 
harmonized EU trademark law, it must be shown, first of all, that 
use of a conflicting sign has taken place “in the course of trade” 
(requirement of use in trade) and “in relation to goods or services” 
(requirement of use as a trademark). Under the aegis of the CJEU, 
these general protection requirements have been relaxed 
continuously. They do not necessarily constitute substantial 
hurdles for trademark owners seeking protection.  
Use of a trademark constitutes “use in the course of trade” in 
the EU where it occurs “in the context of commercial activity with 
a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter.”104 As 
interpreted, this test constitutes a rather low threshold. 
Nevertheless, it confines trademark rights to use that takes place 
in a commercial context. The use of a trademark for the purposes 
of private study, political debate, religious ceremonies, teaching, or 
academic research is unlikely to constitute “use in the course of 
trade” as long as it is of a purely noncommercial nature. 
Irrespective of the acquisition of trademark rights, a religious sign, 
therefore, remains available for strictly religious purposes. A sign 
of cultural significance remains available for strictly cultural 
purposes. However, use of a trademark in a religious, political, or 
cultural context may nevertheless be qualified as use in trade if it 
is combined with a commercial activity, such as marketing of T-
shirts or postcards.105 
To qualify as relevant trademark use, an allegedly infringing 
use must, moreover, constitute use “in relation to goods or 
services.”106 However, this requirement is applied flexibly by the 
CJEU instead of serving as a filter to exclude, from the outset, all 
instances where the trademark is not used in the traditional 
manner, i.e., to indicate commercial source.107 Thus, a mere 
reference to a trademark may be sufficient to trigger an 
infringement action. For instance, use of a mark by a third party to 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See CJEU, judgment of March 23, 2010, Cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis 
Vuitton et al., ¶ 50; CJEU, judgment of November 12, 2002, Case C-206/01, Arsenal/Reed, 
¶ 40. 
 105. See, e.g., German Federal Court of Justice, judgment of February 3, 2005, Case I ZR 
159/02, Lila Postkarte, published in Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht , 583 
(2005); Paris Court of Appeals, 14th chamber, § A, judgments of February 26, 2003, in the 
cases Greenpeace France/Esso and SPCEA/Greenpeace et al., published in 35 Int’l Rev. 
Intell. Prop. Competition L. 342 (2004). For commentary, see C. Geiger, Trade Marks and 
Freedom of Expression—the Proportionality of Criticism, 38 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & 
Competition Law 317 (2007). For a comprehensive overview of relevant case law in different 
EU Member States, see Sakulin, supra note 10. 
 106. See Article 5(1) and (2) of the TMD and Article 9(1) of the CTMR. 
 107. This stricter test, however, was mentioned with regard to the traditional 
identification function of trademarks in CJEU, judgment of January 25, 2007, Case C-48/05, 
Opel/Autec, ¶ 24.  
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inform the public about repair and maintenance services for 
trademarked products has been found to constitute trademark 
use.108 The CJEU also held that use in comparative advertising 
constituted trademark use, because the advertiser used her 
competitor’s trademark to distinguish her own products from those 
of the competitor.109 In addition, the Court assumed that there was 
relevant trademark use where a third party used a company, 
trade, or shop name in such a way that a link was established with 
the goods or services offered by that third party.110 
In light of this elastic standard, use of a trademark as an 
embellishment, rather than as a traditional indicator of source, 
was held to constitute actionable trademark use. In the German 
case Lila Postkarte, the defendant sold postcards that parodied 
trademarks and advertising campaigns of the chocolate producer 
Milka. On purple background corresponding to Milka’s abstract 
color mark, the postcards sought to ridicule the nature idyll with 
cows and mountains that is evoked in Milka advertising. The 
postcards bore the following poem, attributed to “Rainer Maria 
Milka”:  
“Über allen Wipfeln ist Ruh, 
irgendwo blökt eine Kuh. 
Muh!”111 
Assessing this ironic play with Milka insignia, the German Federal 
Court of Justice confirmed the weakness of the requirement of use 
“in relation to goods or services.” It held that for the use of Milka 
trademarks to constitute trademark use in this sense, it was 
sufficient that the postcard called to mind the well-known Milka 
signs.112 The inherent limitation of trademark rights to use “as a 
trademark” thus proved to be an insufficient safeguard of the 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See CJEU, judgment of February 23, 1999, Case C-63/97, BMW/Deenik, ¶ 42. 
 109. See CJEU, judgment of June 12, 2008, Case C-533/06, O2/Hutchison, ¶¶ 35-36. As 
to advertising on the basis of services offered by an Internet search engine, use of a 
competitor’s trademark as a keyword for a sponsored link with one’s own advertising has 
been found to constitute trademark use on similar grounds. See CJEU, judgment of March 
23, 2010, Cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., ¶ 71. 
 110. See CJEU, judgment of September 11, 2007, Case C-17/06, Céline, ¶ 23. See also 
CJEU, February 19, 2009, Case C-62/08, UDV/Brandtraders, ¶ 47. The emphasis on the 
criterion of a mere link with the goods or services offered under a conflicting sign was 
particularly confirmed in cases dealing with keyword advertising. See CJEU, 23 March 
2010, Cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., ¶ 72; July 12, 2011, Case C-
324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, ¶ 92. 
 111.  “It is calm above the tree tops, somewhere a cow is bellowing. Moo!” See German 
Federal Court of Justice, February 3, 2005, Case I ZR 159/02, Lila Postkarte, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 583 (2005). Cf. C. Born, Zur Zulässigkeit einer humorvollen 
Markenparodie—Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BGH “Lila Postkarte,“ Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 192 (2006). 
 112. See the reference to CJEU, judgment of October 23, 2003, Case C-408/01, 
Adidas/Fitnessworld, ¶ 39, in German Federal Court of Justice, February 3, 2005, Case I ZR 
159/02, Lila Postkarte, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 584 (2005). 
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freedom to make a trademark parody.113 Nevertheless, the Court 
ultimately found in favor of the defendant, invoking the open-
ended defense of use with “due cause,” which the German 
Trademark Act provides in line with Article 5(2) of the TMD. 
Weighing Milka’s concerns about a disparagement of the 
trademarks against the fundamental guarantee of the freedom of 
art, the Court concluded that the freedom of art had to prevail in 
light of the ironic statement made with the postcard.114  
Besides the general criteria of “use in the course of trade” and 
“use in relation to goods or services,” EU trademark law sets forth 
specific infringement criteria relating to protection against 
confusion and protection against dilution. These specific 
infringement criteria also shape the relationship between 
trademark law and the public domain: the more strictly they are 
applied, the more freedom of use remains for other traders and the 
public at large. In the area of protection against confusion, for 
instance, a limited scope of protection may result from a low 
degree of distinctiveness.115 In the case Picasso/Picaro, the CJEU 
had to decide on an opposition lodged against the registration of 
the word sign PICARO on the basis of the earlier Community 
Trade Mark PICASSO. The case concerned use for vehicles. The 
Court assumed in this context that, “confronted with the word sign 
PICASSO, the relevant public inevitably sees in it a reference to 
the painter.”116 Against this background, the Court concluded that 
given the painter’s renown with that public, that particularly 
rich conceptual reference is such as greatly to reduce the 
resonance with which, in this case, the sign is endowed as a 
mark, among others, of motor vehicles.117  
Therefore, the scope of protection against confusion may 
remain limited in the case of signs of cultural significance.118 It 
                                                                                                                 
 113. The potential safeguarding function of this general infringement criterion is further 
reduced in EU Member States extending trademark protection to forms of use “other than 
for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services.” See Article 5(5) of the TMD and Article 
2.20(1)(d) of the Benelux Treaty Concerning Intellectual Property. Cf. F. Henning-Bodewig, 
Nicht markenmäßiger Gebrauch und Article 5 Abs. 5 Markenrichtlinie, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht—Internationaler Teil 301 (2008), with regard to the 
influence of Article 5(5) of the TMD on national unfair competition law in other EU Member 
States. 
 114. See German Federal Court of Justice, February 3, 2005, Case I ZR 159/02, Lila 
Postkarte, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 584-585 (2005).  
 115. The degree of distinctiveness is one of the factors to be considered in the framework 
of the infringement analysis. See CJEU, judgment of September 29, 1998, Case C-39/97, 
Canon/Cannon; judgment of June 22, 1999, Case C-342/97, Lloyd/Loint’s. 
 116. See CJEU, judgment of January 12, 2006, Case C-361/04 P, Picasso/Picaro, ¶ 27. 
 117. Id. ¶ 27.  
 118. Deviations from the registered trademark or a different way of presenting the sign 
on goods or services may be sufficient to minimize a potential risk of confusion and mitigate 
the corrosive effect of cultural heritage grabbing. See, e.g., Austrian Supreme Court, 
decision of March 23, 2010, Case 17 Ob 18/09k, Gute Laune Tee, published in Gewerblicher 
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may also be difficult to establish that a sign of cultural significance 
has become a mark with a reputation eligible for anti-dilution 
protection.119 
The situation seems to be different, however, where a 
trademark consists of a sign that has cultural significance but is 
not widely known among the consuming public. A name, symbol or 
melody taken from a culturally important but relatively unknown 
work is unlikely to have a broadly recognized cultural connotation 
capable of weakening the recognition of the sign as an indication of 
commercial origin. Who thinks of Nike, the Greek goddess of 
victory, when seeing the NIKE trademark?120 Who is aware of 
culturally important signs of indigenous communities?121  
Given the relatively low threshold for acquiring anti-dilution 
protection in the EU, unknown signs with cultural significance 
may even become eligible for enhanced protection against dilution. 
In contrast to other trademark systems requiring recognition 
among the general consuming public, niche reputation is sufficient 
under EU trademark law.122 For a trademark to constitute a mark 
with a reputation, it must be known by the target group of the 
goods or services marketed under the trademark. In the case of 
specific products, this target group may be a specialized public, 
such as traders in a specific sector. The required degree of 
knowledge is reached when the mark is known by a significant 
part of the relevant public.123  
Once reputation is established, EU trademark law offers anti-
dilution protection covering blurring, tarnishment, and unfair free-
                                                                                                                 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Int. 82 (2011); German Federal Court of Justice, judgment 
of November 19, 2009, Case I ZR 142/07, MIXI, published in Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht 729, ¶¶ 27-29 (2010), available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de. 
 119. Cf. EU Court of First Instance, June 30, 2009, Case T-435/05, Danjaq/OHIM, ¶¶ 26-
31, rejecting the argument that the sign “Dr. No” had become a well-known mark in the 
sense of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. Cf. A. Ohly, Areas of Overlap Between Trade 
Mark Rights, Copyright and Design Rights in German Law—Report Prepared on Behalf of 
the German Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht—Internationaler Teil 704, 709 (2007). 
 120. With regard to these and further examples, see Assaf, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 121. As to the problem of misappropriation of signs of indigenous communities, see S.R. 
Frankel, Trademarks and Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Intellectual Property Rights, 
in Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research 433 (G.B. 
Dinwoodie & M.D. Janis eds., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008); C. Visser, Culture, 
Traditional Knowledge, and Trademarks: a View from the South, in  id. at 464; J. Pak, Re-
imagining the Wheel: Seeking a Feasible International Regime to Protect Indigenous 
Cultural Expressions Through Trademark Law, 24 Pacific McGeorge Global Business and 
Development L.J. 381 (2011); P.J. Chalk & A. Dunlop, Indigenous Trade Marks and Human 
Rights: An Australian and New Zealand Perspective, 99 TMR 956 (2009); M. Rimmer, 
Australian Icons: Authenticity Marks and Identity Politics, 3 Indigenous L.J. 139 (2004). 
 122. Cf. Senftleben, McCarthy, and Beebe, supra note 44.  
 123. See CJEU, judgment of September 14, 1999, Case C-375/97, General Motors/Yplon, 
¶¶ 24 & 26. In respect of the territorial expansion required, see id. ¶ 28; and judgment of 
October 6, 2009, Case C-301/07, Pago/Lattella, ¶ 29. 
Vol. 103 TMR 809 
riding both in competitive and noncompetitive situations.124 The 
evidence to be produced need not necessarily include proof of a 
change in the economic behavior of consumers. In respect of the 
taking of unfair advantage, it suffices to show that  
a third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to a 
mark with a reputation, to ride on the coat-tails of that 
mark.125  
Moreover, the CJEU refused to consider the need to keep protected 
signs available when determining the scope of protection. In the 
decision Adidas/Marca, the Court explained that it was clear that 
the requirement of availability was  
extraneous both to the assessment of the degree of similarity 
between the mark with a reputation and the sign used by the 
third party and to the link which may be made by the relevant 
public between that mark and the sign.126 
2. Exceptions to Exclusive Rights 
The proprietor of a trademark is not entitled under EU 
trademark law to prohibit a third party from using descriptive 
indications in the course of trade, provided that the use takes place 
in accordance with “honest practices in industrial or commercial 
matters.”127 If trademark protection is acquired with regard to a 
descriptive sign, this exception ensures that the public and other 
traders can still use the sign for the purpose of indicating the 
characteristics of goods or services. For instance, a geographical 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See CJEU, judgment of January 9, 2003, Case C-292/00, Davidoff/Gofkid. As to the 
scope of protection offered in cases of marks having a reputation, see particularly CJEU, 
judgment of June 18, 2009, Case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure. Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, Trade 
Mark Protection—A Black Hole in the Intellectual Property Galaxy?, 42 Int’l Rev. Intell. 
Prop. & Competition L., 383 (2011); A. Ohly, Keyword-Advertising auf dem Weg von 
Karlsruhe nach Luxemburg, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 709, 711-712 
(2009); A. Kur, L. Bently & A. Ohly, Sweet Smells and a Sour Taste—the ECJ’s L’Oréal 
Decision, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law 
Research Paper Series No. 09-12, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492032. 
 125. CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2009, Case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, ¶ 49. However, 
see judgment of November 27, 2008, Case C-252/07, Intel/CPM, ¶ 77, with regard to 
blurring and tarnishment where evidence of a change in consumer behavior may be 
required. Cf. A. Bouvel, Marques et renommée: À propos de l’arrêt “Intel” rendu par la Cour 
de justice des communautés européennes le 27 novembre 2008 (aff. C-252/07), in Les défis du 
droit des marques au XXIe siècle 123 (C. Geiger & J. Schmidt-Szalewski eds., Strasbourg: 
Litec 2010); A.A. Quaedvlieg, INTEL en verwatering: Economisch gedrag en juridisch 
bewijs, Bijblad bij de industriële eigendom 253 (2009); A.A. Quaedvlieg, Herkomst- en 
goodwillinbreuk in het merkenrecht na INTEL en l’Oréal, Ars Aequi 799 (2009); S. 
Middlemiss & S. Warner, The Protection of Marks with a Reputation: Intel v CPM, Eur. 
Intell. Prop. Rev. 326, 331-332 (2009). For a critical comment on intuitive protection against 
free-riding as a species of unjust enrichment law, M.A. Lemley & M.P. McKenna, Owning 
Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 137 (2010).  
 126. CJEU, judgment of April 10, 2008, Case C-102/07, Adidas/Marca, ¶ 43. 
 127. See Article 6(1)(b) of the TMD and Article 12(b) of the CTMR. 
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name that has become a trademark remains available for use as 
an indication of the geographical origin of goods or services from 
the area concerned. As long as the user of a geographical term is 
not found to be unfairly competing with the proprietor of the 
trademark, the exception may even cover use of the indication as 
part of the labelling of products having the geographical origin.128 
The exception may also justify the unauthorized use of product 
packaging. As the CJEU elaborated in the decision Henkel, “the 
possibility that the packaging might describe the characteristics of 
the product, including its quality, cannot be ruled out.”129 In such a 
case, the exception thus also ensures the availability of a 
descriptive shape. 
Similarly, commercial use may be justified in light of the 
exemption of descriptive use, if a sign of cultural or religious 
significance is perceived by the public as an indication of product 
characteristics rather than an indication of origin. The indications 
“Mozarttorte” (Mozart cake) and “Mozartkugel” (Mozart ball), for 
instance, are likely to be perceived as an indication of a particular 
type of cake or chocolate product by the consuming public in 
several EU Member States. Against this background, use of these 
indications—in the sense of information about product 
characteristics—is unlikely to give rise to a conflict with the 
Community Trade Mark MOZART.130  
If a sign becomes a mark with a reputation, it enjoys, as 
explained above, not only protection against confusion but also 
protection against blurring, tarnishment, and unfair free-riding. In 
this area of enhanced protection against dilution, trademark rights 
cannot successfully be invoked, if the defendant’s use of the 
trademark is made with “due cause.”131 As the Lila Postkarte 
decision shows, this open-ended due cause defense can be 
employed to offer room for trademark parody. More generally, it 
may justify use for the purposes of criticism and review. By finding 
that unauthorized use was made with due cause, courts in the EU 
can thus ensure that trademarked signs remain available for 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See CJEU, judgment of January 7, 2004, Case C-100/02, Gerolsteiner 
Brunnen/Putsch, ¶¶ 15 & 26. 
 129. See CJEU, judgment of February 12, 2004, Case C-218/01, Henkel/DPMA, ¶ 42. 
 130. See Higher Court of Appeals München, judgment of July 26, 2001, Case 29 U 
6000/00, published in Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht-Rechtsprechungsreport 
12, 13 (2002). In the meantime, the Community Trade Mark has been invalidated because of 
its descriptive character with regard to “pastry and confectionary, chocolate products and 
sugar confectionary.” See EU Court of First Instance, judgment of July 9, 2008, Case T-
304/06, Paul Reber/OHIM, ¶ 99. As to the distinction between use as a trademark and use 
as a product description, see V. Di Cataldo, The Trade Mark with a Reputation in EU Law—
Some Remarks on the Negative Condition “Without Due Cause,” 42 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & 
Competition L. 833, 838-840 (2011). 
 131. See Article 5(2) of the TMD and Article 9(1)(c) of the CTMR. 
Vol. 103 TMR 811 
public debate, even if they become marks with a reputation.132 In 
Interflora/Marks & Spencer, the CJEU also recognized a due 
cause defense with regard to unauthorized use of a trademark 
aiming to inform consumers about alternative offers in the 
marketplace.133 The “due cause” defense, therefore, also serves as a 
means of enhancing competition by keeping protected signs 
available for use by other traders.  
Further exceptions to trademark rights in the EU concern use 
of one’s own name or address in the course of trade,134 and use 
necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, 
in particular as accessories or spare parts.135 Moreover, on the 
basis of EU legislation in the field of misleading and comparative 
advertising,136 the CJEU established an additional exception 
covering the use of a trademark in permissible comparative 
advertising, provided that such use satisfies all conditions 
following from EU legislation in that area.137 References to 
another’s trademark in comparative advertising, or advertising 
indicating the intended purpose of goods or services, thus need not 
constitute trademark infringement even though it may constitute, 
as discussed above, relevant “use in relation to goods or services” 
under the elastic test of trademark use applied by the CJEU. 
IV. A MODEL FOR OTHER REGIONS? 
The analysis of EU trademark law shows that all four 
preservation mechanisms identified in Part II above—conditional 
and unconditional exclusions from trademark protection, inherent 
limits, and explicit exceptions to exclusive rights—are used with 
regard to certain categories of signs. In the field of exclusions, the 
                                                                                                                 
 132. As to the role of the due cause defense in safeguarding freedom of expression, see 
also German Federal Court of Justice, March 11, 2008, Case VI ZR 7/07, Gen-Milch, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2110 (2008); District Court of Amsterdam, December 22, 2006, 
Case KG ZA 06-2120, Denk vooruit, Intellectuele eigendom en reclamerecht 139 (2007); 
Paris Court of Appeals, February 26, 2003, Greenpeace/Esso, 35 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & 
Competition L. 342 (2004). For an overview of case law, see Sakulin, supra note 10; C. 
Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental 
Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 Int’l Review of Intell. Prop. & 
Comp. L. 371 (2006); C. Rohnke, K. Bott, K.-U. Jonas & S. Asschenfeldt, Konflikte zwischen 
Markenrechten und dem Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht—Internationaler Teil 419 (2005). 
 133. CJEU, September 22, 2011, Case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer, ¶ 91. 
 134. See Article 6(1)(a) of the TMD and Article 12(a) of the CTMR. 
 135. See Article 6(1)(c) of the TMD and Article 12(c) of the CTMR. 
 136. See the Misleading Advertisement Directive 84/450 of September 10, 1984, as 
amended by the Comparative Advertisement Directive 97/55 of October 6, 1997. These two 
Directives are now consolidated in the Misleading and Comparative Advertisement 
Directive 2006/114/EC of December 12, 2006. 
 137. See CJEU, June 12, 2008, Case C-533/06, O2/Hutchison, ¶ 45; CJEU, June 18, 
2009, Case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, ¶ 54. 
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system places much reliance on the requirement of distinctiveness 
as a preservation tool. In particular with regard to nontraditional 
trademarks and signs of cultural significance, this approach raises 
the question whether EU trademark law provides incentives that 
are counterproductive to the preservation of the public domain, in 
the sense that they may actually encourage merchants to invest in 
the acquisition of distinctiveness through use with regard to signs 
that constitute important public domain material (see Part IV.A 
below). As to safeguards for freedom of use, a need for additional 
exceptions comes to the fore after extensions of EU trademark 
rights that weakened inherent limits to the scope of protection, in 
particular the broad interpretation of what constitutes actionable 
use as a trademark. Analysis of EU trademark law thus yields the 
insight that mere reliance on inherent limits of trademark rights 
may be insufficient as a strategy to safeguard user freedoms (see 
Part IV.B below). 
A. Reliance on the Requirement of Distinctiveness 
As explained above, the CJEU posited that consumers were 
not in the habit of making assumptions about the commercial 
origin of goods or services simply on the basis of product shapes or 
color per se.138 Thus, these types of marks are, except in very 
limited circumstances, not inherently distinctive. As there is a 
possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade, 
however, the bar to trademark protection remains surmountable 
and unpredictable. In essence, EU trademark law leaves the 
decision on trademark protection for shapes and color per se to the 
marketing efforts of traders and the impact of these efforts on the 
perception of consumers. Absent the hope or expectation of 
judicially recognized exclusivity, enterprises might be reticent to 
invest heavily in efforts to create commercial association of source 
with respect to shapes or color per se. Under current EU law, 
however, enterprises are likely to see the possibility of acquiring 
trademark rights as an incentive to invest in signs of this type. 
The EU trademark system may thus provide a de facto incentive 
for enterprises to invest in advertising campaigns educating 
consumers to perceive a shape or individual color as an indication 
of commercial source.  
From the perspective of public domain preservation, this 
approach is problematic. Given the additional inroads into the 
public domain that result each time a new type of mark is 
recognized, it may be argued that the aim to preserve the public 
domain should prevail. The counterargument of a risk of consumer 
                                                                                                                 
 138. CJEU, judgment of February 12, 2004, Case C-218/01, Henkel/DPMA, ¶ 52; 
judgment of April 8, 2003, Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde and others, ¶ 48; judgment of 
May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep/Benelux-Merkenbureau, ¶ 65. 
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confusion can be unmasked as a circular line of reasoning: without 
the loophole of obtaining distinctiveness through use in trade as a 
basis for the acquisition of trademark rights, there would be less 
legal security for investment in new types of marks. Marketing 
campaigns aiming to teach consumers to recognize new types of 
marks as identifiers of commercial source would be less attractive. 
This, in turn, would lead to a situation where the need to reduce a 
potential risk of consumer confusion by awarding trademark 
protection is less likely to arise in the first place. If enterprises 
refrained from targeted efforts to teach consumers to recognize 
new types of marks as source identifiers, consumers would not be 
confused with regard to the commercial origin of goods or services 
when these signs are used in the marketplace. As Professor 
Ramsey argued with regard to descriptive marks in the context of 
U.S. trademark law,  
. . . circular reasoning underlies the argument that confusing 
use of a descriptive term as a mark is misleading and can 
therefore be restricted to protect consumers. By granting and 
enforcing exclusive rights in descriptive marks, the 
government helps to make those marks source-identifying, 
which leads to the possibility of consumer confusion in the 
first place.139 
A similar problem arises with regard to signs of cultural 
significance. EU trademark law, as explained above, provides for 
the possibility of outright exclusion of official signs, signs of high 
symbolic value, and religious signs.140 However, these 
unconditional exclusions do not necessarily reduce the exposure of 
cultural signs to trademark protection. A sign of cultural 
significance may constitute an important national symbol and fall 
under the exclusion of signs with a high symbolic value that has 
been adopted in several EU Member States. Cultural signs 
without high symbolic value, however, remain unaffected. The 
shape exclusions in EU trademark law141 may keep certain 
industrial designs and other three-dimensional creations with 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Ramsey, supra note 29, at 1150. Cf. also Denicola, supra note 29, at 170. For a 
critical assessment of trademark claims based on consumer expectations in general, see 
M.P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1839, 1899 (2007): “Loosed from its natural rights moorings and bounded only by consumer 
expectations, modern trademark law essentially instantiates a one-way ratchet to broader 
trademark rights. As courts in the early twentieth century broadened trademark owners’ 
rights, consumers grew to expect that trademark owners had increasingly broad control 
over their marks. Those changed consumer expectations then became the basis for even 
broader trademark rights, which then in turn created even greater expectations. And on it 
has spiraled, with the help of marketers, who specialize in influencing consumer 
expectations.” 
 140. Arts. 3(1)(h), 3(2)(b) and (c) of the TMD. 
 141. Art. 3(1)(e) of the TMD. 
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cultural significance free from trademark protection.142 So far, 
however, these exclusions remained limited to three-dimensional 
signs.143 While this may be an efficient safeguard against the 
acquisition of trademark rights to technical solutions,144 cultural 
material is much more diverse. Two-dimensional shapes, such as 
drawings, paintings and photographs, and musical shapes such as 
melodies, do not qualify for the shape exclusions.  
Furthermore, courts in the EU seem hesitant to use the 
prohibition against registration of signs that are considered 
immoral or a threat to public order to exclude signs of cultural 
significance.145 Only in cases of “cultural heritage grabbing” do 
judges seem prepared to deny registration on the grounds that the 
application was made in a bad faith effort to inhibit others from 
using the sign.146 
Hence, the analysis brings to light a peculiar difference in the 
treatment of official, religious, and technical signs on the one 
hand, and cultural signs on the other. While EU trademark law 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See General Court of the European Union, October 6, 2011, Case T-508/08, Bang & 
Olufsen/OHIM. For a proposal to generally extend the substantial value exclusion to all 
shapes that are attractive because of their beauty, see V. Vanovermeire, Inschrijving als 
merk van een in het openbaar domein gevallen werk, in, Le cumul des droits intellectuels 
177, 201-203 (A. Cruquenaire & S. Dusollier eds., Brussels: Larcier 2009). 
 143. As discussed above, the attempt made by the German Federal Patent Court, 
November 9, 2005, Case 29 W (pat) 147/03, Porträtfoto Marlene Dietrich, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 333 (2006), to apply the exclusion to a portrait photograph 
was overruled by the German Federal Court of Justice, April 24, 2008, Case I ZB 21/06, 
Marlene-Dietrich-Bildnis, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1093 (2008). Under 
the former Benelux provisions that served as a model for the current EU shape exclusions, 
the question of application to two-dimensional shapes arose in the Burberry cases. In this 
context, an attempt to extend the exclusion’s scope to two-dimensional shapes was made 
with regard to Burberrys’ tartan pattern by the Dutch courts. The Benelux Court of Justice, 
April 14, 1989, Case A 87/8, Burberrys I, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1989, no. 834, ¶ 9, was 
prevented from a decision on this matter for procedural reasons in the first Burberry case. 
In a further decision on the tartan pattern, however, the Benelux Court of Justice, 
December 16, 1992, Case A 90/4, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1992, no. 596, Burberrys II, 
¶¶ 34-44, explicitly rejected the extension and confined the scope of the exclusion to three-
dimensional shapes. 
 144. Cf. CJEU, June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99, Philips/Remington; CJEU, September 14, 
2010, Case C-48/09P, Lego/Mega Brands. See also the analysis of the functionality doctrine 
conducted by M.P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 Houston L. Rev. 824, 859-860 (2011), 
who concludes that different approaches to technical and aesthetic functionality can only be 
harmonized on the basis of an overarching concept of fair competition that permits 
consistent answers to the question of whether, and to what extent, the copying of product 
features in general should be permissible or not. 
 145. This argument was at least explicitly rejected by the German Federal Patent Court, 
November 25, 1997, Case 24 W (pat) 188/96, Mona Lisa, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht 1021, 1023 (1998). 
 146. See Higher Court of Appeals Dresden, judgment of April 4, 2000, Case 14 U 
3611/99, published in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2001), at 615. The case concerned the 
registration of the name and portrait of Johann Sebastian Bach as a trademark for various 
goods and services and the systematic assertion of trademark rights against traders in the 
markets concerned even though the trademark owner had not started using the signs 
himself. 
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provides for specific mechanisms that allow the unconditional 
exclusion from trademark appropriation of official, religious, and 
technical signs, it largely leaves the acquisition of trademark 
rights relating to signs of cultural significance to the basic 
protection requirement of distinctive character. In consequence, 
cultural signs, such as the name and portrait of a famous artist, 
distinctive parts of a painting, drawing or photograph, or a melody 
taken from a piece of classical music, can be registered as a 
trademark in many cases.  
As a result of their predominant cultural meaning, signs of 
cultural significance may be qualified as rather weak trademarks. 
However, the CJEU refused to include the need to keep signs 
available for the public or other traders as a factor to be considered 
in the infringement analysis.147 A sign’s cultural significance, 
therefore, leads only to a relative weakness that may be overcome 
through marketing efforts.148 It does not constitute a stable factor 
to be considered generally in the context of infringement claims. 
As in the case of other new or nontraditional types of marks, the 
EU system permitting the acquisition of trademark rights once a 
sign of cultural significance has become distinctive may thus 
encourage enterprises to invest in advertising presenting a 
culturally important sign as an indication of commercial source. 
Positive cultural connotations attached to a sign may even spur 
investment by entrepreneurs seeking to benefit from pre-existing 
goodwill and recognition associated with signs of cultural 
significance. On its merits, the EU system thus provides incentives 
for advertising that may be qualified as a form of free-riding on a 
sign’s positive cultural connotations and may lead to unfair 
competitive advantages.149  
Once a cultural sign is entered in the trademark register, this 
registration may be used strategically by the trademark owner as 
an instrument to threaten third parties using the sign in unrelated 
contexts. As explained above, mere references to the trademark 
can constitute relevant use as a trademark and offer a basis for an 
infringement claim in the EU. Thus, aggressive enforcement of 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See CJEU, judgment of April 10, 2008, Case C-102/07, Adidas/Marca, ¶¶ 30 & 43. 
 148. Assaf, supra note 6, at 2-3, gives the example that the original cultural meanings of 
the names of the Greek goddess Nike and the mythological Greek hero Ajax have been 
superseded by commercial marketing messages. Irrespective of the cultural meaning of 
these signs, the respective trademark owners were capable of establishing well-known 
trademarks. 
 149. See Ramsey, supra note 29, at 1155, who concludes with regard to the use of 
descriptive trademarks: “In contrast, when a descriptive term is first used as a mark, that 
mark is not yet distinctive, but it is valuable instantly—before any advertising or sales—
because the term is attribute-identifying and provides information about the qualities and 
characteristics of the product. A business that selects and uses a descriptive term as a mark 
on its products is, in effect, free-riding off the attribute-identifying value of the descriptive 
term.” 
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trademark registrations incorporating a cultural sign may have a 
deterrent—or “chilling”—effect on cultural activities, particularly 
in the case of trademark owners pursuing an aggressive 
enforcement strategy.150 For this reason, other mechanisms for 
preserving user freedoms as part of the public domain seem 
indispensable—in particular, the further development of 
exceptions that can serve as defenses, such as the exemption of use 
of descriptive indications and the flexible defense of use with “due 
cause.”  
The relative ease of registration of cultural signs in the EU 
also exacerbates the risk of overlapping copyright and trademark 
protection. This overlap becomes problematic when trademark 
protection remains after copyright expiry: the copyright principle 
of a limited term of protection is then undermined by the 
trademark rule of indefinite renewal.151  
EU trademark law provides for certain safeguards against 
protection overlaps. The unconditional exclusion of shapes that 
(i) result from the nature of the goods, (ii) are necessary to obtain a 
technical result, or (iii) give substantial value to the goods can be 
deemed efficient in relation to technical solutions and three-
dimensional industrial designs—the subjects of patent and 
industrial designs law. However, a comparable boundary line with 
regard to copyright protection does not exist, even though 
                                                                                                                 
 150. For an example of such an aggressive strategy relating to industrial design rights, 
see District Court of The Hague, May 4, 2011, Case LJN: BQ3525, Nadia Plesner/Louis 
Vuitton, available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl, dealing with an infringement action 
brought by Louis Vuitton against Plesner’s painting Darfurnica because it shows a poor 
black boy with a Louis Vuitton handbag. For a case comment, see D.J.G. Visser, Darfurnica: 
modellenrecht versus kunstvrijheid, Nederlands Juristenblad 740-742 (2011). 
 151. With regard to the discussion on cumulative copyright and trademark protection, 
see M. Leistner & E. Derclaye, Intellectual Property Overlaps—A European Perspective 12-
15, 47-60, 130-138, 200-205, 237-254 (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing 2011); S. Carre, 
Marques et droit d’auteur: Métaphore d’une belle rencontre in Les défis du droit des marques 
au XXIe siècle 25 (C. Geiger & J. Schmidt-Szalewski eds., Strasbourg: Litec 2010); V. 
Vanovermeire, Inschrijving als merk van een in het openbaar domein gevallen werk, in Le 
cumul des droits intellectuels 177 (A. Cruquenaire/S. Dusollier eds., Brussels: Larcier 2009); 
M.P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling? 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 873 (2009); 
A. Ohly, Areas of Overlap Between Trade Mark Rights, Copyright and Design Rights in 
German Law, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International 704 (2007); 
M.R.F. Senftleben, De samenloop van auteurs- en merkenrecht – een internationaal 
perspectief, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 67 (2007); G. Dinwoodie, 
Trademark and Copyright: Complements or Competitors?, in ALAI 2001 USA—Proceedings 
of the ALAI Congress June 13-17, 2001 498 (J.C. Ginsburg & J.M. Besek eds., New York: 
ALAI-USA 2002); A. Kur, Funktionswandel von Schutzrechten: Ursachen und Konsequenzen 
der inhaltlichen Annäherung und Überlappung von Schutzrechtstypen, in Geistiges 
Eigentum im Dienst der Innovation 23, 42-50 (G. Schricker, T. Dreier & A. Kur eds., Baden-
Baden: Nomos 2001); P.B. Hugenholtz, Over cumulatie gesproken, Bijblad bij de industriële 
eigendom 240 (2000); D.W.F. Verkade, The Cumulative Effect of Copyright Law and 
Trademark Law: Which Takes Precedence?, in Intellectual Property and Information Law—
Essays in Honour of Herman Cohen Jehoram 69 (J.J.C. Kabel & G.J.H.M. Mom eds., Den 
Haag/London/Boston: Kluwer 1998); J.H. Spoor, De gestage groei van merk, werk en 
uitvinding (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink 1990). 
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copyright law, like patent and industrial designs legislation, 
provides for a limited term of protection to allow the productive 
reuse of formerly protected material. In comparison with the 
efforts made to prevent trademark protection from interfering with 
follow-on innovation in the areas of technology and product design, 
follow-on innovation in the cultural sector is thus exposed to the 
corrosive effect of trademark protection to a much larger extent.152 
The flexible EU approach to trademark protection for cultural 
signs can be understood to cause an imbalance within the 
intellectual property system as a whole. 
The existence of unconditional exclusions from protection 
covering official, religious, and technical signs in EU trademark 
law, and the absence of comparable exclusions specifically dealing 
with signs of cultural significance, thus casts doubt upon the 
consistency of the EU intellectual property system. The reliance 
placed on the requirement of distinctiveness as a preservation tool 
is not only dubious with regard to new types of marks but also in 
respect of signs of cultural significance. If an unconditional 
exclusion were applied to cultural signs, this would guarantee 
their unencumbered use for social, educational, and cultural 
purposes. Such a guarantee of free use without a risk of trademark 
infringement would support follow-on innovation in the cultural 
sector.153 
B. Need for Additional Exceptions 
As explained above, the CJEU has continued to relax the 
general protection requirements of “use in the course of trade” and 
“use in relation to goods or services.” In particular, the 
requirement of use in relation to goods or services (requirement of 
trademark use) has been applied rather flexibly. In principle, this 
general prerequisite for relief could be applied to limit a trademark 
owner’s rights against third parties to instances where the senior 
                                                                                                                 
 152. However, see Peukert, supra note 4, p. 110-113, who wants to leave more room for 
overlaps between copyright and trademark protection by qualifying trademark protection as 
the more specific type of intellectual property because trademark rights do not cover the 
protected subject matter as such but remain limited to certain functions which the protected 
subject matter fulfils with regard to goods or services. While the inherent limits of 
trademark protection must necessarily be factored into the equation, this view seems to lose 
sight of the vulnerability of the cultural (and technical) innovation cycle and the corrosive 
effect that even limited trademark protection may have. 
 153. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Senftleben, supra note 6. As to a 
discussion of the determinants of cultural creativity against the background of public 
domain preservation in copyright law, see J.E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and 
Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in Guibault/Hugenholtz, supra note 12, at 121, 137-
156. Trademark legislation that lends more weight to the preservation of cultural heritage 
by explicitly providing for grounds for refusal covering national cultural heritage objects 
and objects of world cultural or natural heritage can be found, for instance, in the Russian 
Federation. See K. Fedotova, Report on the Russian Federation, in Senftleben, supra note 2, 
at 249.  
818 Vol. 103 TMR 
user’s trademark is employed by a junior user “as a trademark,” 
i.e., to identify the source of its own goods or services. Such a 
requirement would serve as a filter to exclude claims that are 
unrelated to the identification and distinction of goods and services 
and, hence, do not impact the core principles of trademark 
protection, but would leave considerable breathing space for 
freedom of use in political, cultural, educational, and social 
contexts.154 
However, the CJEU has taken essentially the opposite 
approach, weakening the trademark use requirement instead of 
sharpening its conceptual contours. As explained above, the Court 
even expressed the view that, for satisfying the requirement of 
trademark use, it was sufficient that a mere link was established 
with the trademark. In consequence, the purported threshold of 
establishing trademark use does not prevent trademark owners 
from successfully pursuing third-party uses, i.e., in spare part 
descriptions, comparative advertising or parodies, that are not—
and are not intended to be—perceived as indications of the 
commercial source of the users’ own goods or services. On the 
contrary, referential use of this kind is brought within the reach of 
the exclusive rights of trademark owners. The impact of this broad 
concept on use for political, cultural, educational, and social 
purposes is considerable when the use is of a (partly) commercial 
nature. As described above, even decorative use that merely calls 
to mind the protected trademark may give rise to an infringement 
action in these circumstances. 
                                                                                                                 
 154. For a discussion of the concept of trademark use in EU trademark law, see A. Kur, 
Confusion Over Use? Die Benutzung “als Marke” im Lichte der EuGH-Rechtsprechung, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht—Internationaler Teil 1, 11 (2008); P.J. Yap, 
Essential Function of a Trade Mark: From BMW to O2, Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 81, 86-87 
(2009); I. Simon Fhima, How Does “Essential Function” Doctrine Drive European Trade 
Mark Law?, 36 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 401 (2005); P.L. Loughlan, 
Protecting Culturally Significant Uses of Trade Marks (Without a First Amendment), Eur. 
Intell. Prop. Rev. 328 (2000). As to the recognition of a potential gatekeeper function of the 
trademark use requirement in U.S. and EU law, see M.R.F. Senftleben, Keyword 
Advertising in Europe—How the Internet Challenges Recent Expansions of EU Trademark 
Protection, 27 Conn. J. Int’l L. 39 (2011); S.L. Dogan & M.A. Lemley, The Trademark Use 
Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 541, 542 (2008): 
“By maintaining the law’s focus on misleading branding, the trademark use doctrine keeps 
trademark law true to its ultimate goal of promoting competitive markets.” However, see 
also G.B. Dinwoodie & M.D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 
92 Iowa L. Rev. 1597, 1657-1658 (2007), who doubt that problems arising in the current 
“expansionist climate” could be solved by recalibrating the notion of trademark use: 
“Trademark use is simply too blunt a concept, no matter how defined, to capture the full 
range of values at play in these debates.” For a summary of the debate, see M. Davison & F. 
Di Giantomasso, Use as a Trade Mark: Avoiding Confusion When Considering Dilution, Eur. 
Intell. Prop. Rev. 443 (2009); M.P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 
Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 773 (2009). For a fundamental critique of the continuous expansion 
seeking to reduce the scope of trademark protection to the traditional origin function, see, 
moreover, Peukert, supra note 4, at 96-107. 
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The reason for the increasingly elastic application of general 
protection requirements, such as the requirement of use in relation 
to goods or services, can be seen in the recognition of a broader 
range of protected trademark functions.155 The CJEU no longer 
focuses on the traditional function of indicating source or origin.156 
In L’Oréal/Bellure, the Court held that a trademark’s quality, 
communication, investment, and advertising functions enjoyed 
absolute protection in double identity cases falling under Article 
5(1)(a) of the TMD.157 These latter functions are typically fulfilled 
by marks with a reputation. A strong brand may go beyond mere 
source identification, conveying lifestyle messages that are the 
result of substantial investment in advertising. Protection of a 
trademark’s communication, investment, and advertising 
functions is thus protection of the investment in the creation of a 
favorable brand image and the brand communication based on this 
image.  
The assumption expressed in Part II with regard to the 
interplay between inherent limits of exclusive rights as implicit 
safeguards of user freedoms and the adoption of exceptions as 
explicit safeguards of user freedoms can thus be confirmed in light 
of current developments in EU trademark law: the weaker the 
inherent limits of exclusive trademark rights, the stronger the 
need for the adoption of exceptions that explicitly exempt certain 
forms of use from the control of the trademark owner. As posited 
by Professor Dinwoodie with regard to similar developments in 
U.S. trademark law:  
[A]s the scope of trademark protection expands and the metes 
and bounds of protection become more uncertain, we cannot 
rely exclusively on creative interpretation of the prima facie 
cause of action to establish limits. Trademark law must more 
consciously develop defenses that reflect the competing values 
at stake in trademark disputes.158  
                                                                                                                 
 155. For an overview of trademark functions, pointing out this traditional focus on 
identification and distinction functions and potential extensions with regard to 
communication, investment and advertising functions, see R. Keim, Der markenrechtliche 
Tatbestand der Verwechslungsgefahr 37-61 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2009). 
 156. For an early use of this formula, CJEU, 3 December 3, 1981, Case C-1/81, Pfizer v. 
Eurim-Pharm, ¶ 8. As to the reappearance of the same formula in later judgments, see 
particularly CJEU, November 12, 2002, Case C-206/01, Arsenal/Reed, ¶ 48. Cf. I. Simon 
Fhima, How Does “Essential Function” Doctrine Drive European Trade Mark Law?, 36 Int’l 
Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 401 (2005).  
 157. See CJEU, June 18, 2009, Case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, ¶ 58. For comments on 
this development, see Senftleben, supra note 154, at 39; Kur, Bently, Ohly, supra note 124; 
F. Hacker, Funktionenlehre und Benutzungsbegriff nach “L’Oréal,” Markenrecht 333 (2009). 
 158. G.B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: 
Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 Lewis and Clark L. Rev. 99, 152 (2009). Cf. W. 
McGeveran, Rethinking Trade Mark Fair Use, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 49 (2008).  
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Against this backdrop, the need for new exceptions in EU 
trademark law is evident. With the relaxation of the requirement 
of use in relation to goods or services to impose liability on a junior 
user, the CJEU offers broad access to trademark protection beyond 
the traditional function of distinguishing one’s goods or services 
from those of others. Without appropriate exceptions providing 
defenses in infringement cases, the reaction of EU trademark law 
to forms of referential and decorative use will most probably be too 
harsh.159 An enhanced infrastructure of exceptions is needed to re-
establish a proper balance between rights and freedoms. 
There is some cause for optimism in the EU, however, as the 
process of devising new exceptions has already started. In 
O2/Hutchison, the CJEU itself, as indicated above, took steps to 
create additional breathing space for references to trademarks in 
comparative advertising: 
[I]n order to reconcile the protection of registered marks and 
the use of comparative advertising, Article 5(1) and (2) of 
Directive 89/104 and Article 3a(1) of Directive 84/450 must be 
interpreted to the effect that the proprietor of a registered 
trade mark is not entitled to prevent the use, by a third party, 
of a sign identical with, or similar to, his mark, in a 
comparative advertisement which satisfies all the conditions, 
laid down in Article 3a(1) of Directive 84/450, under which 
comparative advertising is permitted.160 
The rules of the EU Comparative Advertisement Directive are 
thus openly applied as an external balancing tool that is not 
reflected in EU trademark law itself.161  
In Interflora/Marks & Spencer, while the CJEU confirmed its 
broad concept of protection against unfair free-riding in dilution 
cases, it nevertheless demonstrated again its willingness to 
counterbalance broad exclusive rights by recognizing new 
exceptions.162 In principle, an online advertiser who derives 
benefits from a trademark with a reputation by selecting that 
trademark as a keyword for its own advertising takes unfair 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Cf. Max Planck Institute, supra note 61, ¶¶ 2.260-2.262, proposing the inclusion of 
an explicit limitation regarding honest referential use that, besides comparative 
advertising, would cover use for purposes of indicating replacement or service, use for 
purposes of commentary and criticism, and parody. 
 160. See CJEU, June 12, 2008, Case C-533/06, O2/Hutchison, ¶ 45. The Court confirmed 
this new limitation in L’Oréal/Bellure. See CJEU, June 18, 2009, Case C-487/07, 
L’Oréal/Bellure, ¶ 54. 
 161. In O2/Hutchison, the CJEU could establish a link between the prohibition of 
confusion in Art. 3a(1)(d) of the Comparative Advertisement Directive and the likelihood of 
confusion test in Art. 5(1)(b) of the TMD. See CJEU, June 12, 2008, Case C-533/06, 
O2/Hutchison, ¶ 69, and operative part. The balancing via external norms was less obvious 
under these circumstances. 
 162. CJEU, September 22, 2011, Case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer, ¶ 74. The 
formula was developed in CJEU, June 18, 2009, Case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, ¶ 49. 
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advantage of the senior user’s trademark with a reputation.163 On 
the other hand, however, the Court wrote: 
where the advertisement displayed on the internet on the 
basis of a keyword corresponding to a trade mark with a 
reputation puts forward—without offering a mere imitation of 
the goods or services of the proprietor of that trade mark, 
without causing dilution or tarnishment and without, 
moreover, adversely affecting the functions of the trade mark 
concerned—an alternative to the goods or services of the 
proprietor of the trade mark with a reputation, it must be 
concluded that such use falls, as a rule, within the ambit of 
fair competition in the sector for the goods or services 
concerned and is thus not without “due cause” for the purposes 
of Article 5(2).164 
The Court thus introduced a new type of “due cause” defense 
covering the purchase of trademarks as keywords in online 
advertising for the purpose of informing internet users of 
alternatives in the marketplace. As explained above, the defense of 
“due cause” also plays a central role in safeguarding the freedom of 
parody, criticism, and comment. This flexible preservation tool, 
however, is available only in the context of anti-dilution protection 
under Article 5(2) of the TMD.  
In double identity cases falling under Article 5(1)(a) of the 
TMD, there is no comparable balancing tool. Considering that the 
CJEU seeks to protect goodwill functions in double identity cases 
besides the essential origin function, this is highly problematic.165 
The development of new defenses in EU trademark law must thus 
be seen as an incomplete process. Potentially, the CJEU will 
directly invoke the fundamental guarantee of freedom of 
expression in Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights to 
create the required breathing space.166 In the present situation, 
however, the need to enshrine appropriate new defenses for 
parody, criticism, and comment in EU trademark law is even more 
pressing than in the case of comparative advertising, where the 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See CJEU, September 22, 2011, Case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer, ¶¶ 86-
89. 
 164. Id. ¶ 91. 
 165. See the critique by A. Ohly, Keyword Advertising auf dem Weg zurück von 
Luxemburg nach Paris, Wien, Karlsruhe und Den Haag, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht 776, 780, 782 (2010); F. Hacker, Funktionenlehre und Benutzungsbegriff nach 
“L’Oréal,” Markenrecht 333, 337 (2009). Cf. also Max Planck Institute, supra note 61, ¶ 
2.260, stating that the present state of law is unsatisfactory because of absolute protection 
“in the sense that it does not depend on any balancing of interests, apart from a functional 
analysis.” 
 166. With regard to the impact of the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression 
on trademark protection, see the literature references supra note 10. 
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specific rules laid down in the Comparative Advertisement 
Directive are readily available.167 
A need for new exceptions to trademark rights may also arise 
in the area of research and teaching, and use for cultural purposes. 
Activities in these fields do not necessarily occur in the course of 
trade and may often be outside the reach of trademark rights from 
the outset. With increasing partnerships between private 
companies and educational, scientific, and cultural institutions, 
however, the question of whether such use is “in trade” may 
become less clear-cut, notwithstanding that the socially valuable 
objectives of sponsored activities may still justify an exemption 
from the control exerted by trademark owners.168 In the case of 
cultural activities, it can be added that freedom of artistic 
expression may be understood to cover accompanying promotion 
and marketing activities.169 From this perspective, it also makes 
sense not to rely exclusively on inherent limits of trademark 
protection following from the condition of use in the course of 
trade, but to devise exceptions that explicitly confirm the freedom 
to make such uses and serve as defenses in infringement cases. 
The proposal of the European Commission for amending EU 
trademark legislation contains important impulses in this regard. 
The Commission seeks to introduce an exception covering 
referential use in general.170 If this additional exception were to be 
                                                                                                                 
 167. For case law and literature reflecting the need for appropriate preservation tools 
covering use for purposes of parody, criticism, and comment, see supra note 132. For an 
example from outside the EU, see Constitutional Court of South Africa, May 27, 2005, 
Laugh it Off Promotions CC vs. South African Breweries Int. (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark 
Int., Case CCT 42/04, 36 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 868 (2005), with case 
comment by Z.M. Navsa, Trademark Dilution—No Laughing Matter, Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 
455 (2009). 
 168. Cf. the analysis conducted by the Max Planck Institute, supra note 61, ¶ 2.66, 
according to which “it appears that “in the course of trade” must be distinguished primarily 
from private use.” Cf. also ¶¶ 2.160-2.162 of the analysis. Educational, scientific, and 
cultural use does not constitute private use in a strict sense. Hence, it may qualify as use in 
the course of trade in certain cases and become subject to the exclusive rights of trademark 
owners.  
 169. For an approach to the fundamental freedom of art covering both creation 
(“Werkbereich”) and dissemination (“Wirkbereich”), see German Federal Constitutional 
Court, November 3, 1987, Case 1 BvR 1257/84, “Herrnburger Bericht,” published in the 
official collection BVerfGE 77 (1987), 240, where the Court held that the freedom of art 
covered advertising for a work of art. If the trademark of a third party is used for the 
purpose of advertising an art work, this freedom of art, necessarily, must be reconciled with 
the fundamental guarantee of property, including intellectual property. Cf. H.D. Jarass & B. 
Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland—Kommentar 207-212 (11th ed., 
Munich: C.H. Beck 2010). A new trademark limitation regulating this field could provide 
guidance for an appropriate balancing of interests in this context. As to the status of 
intellectual property within the EU system of human rights, see the critical comments by C. 
Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!?—Article 17(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope, 
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 113 (2009). 
 170. See Article 14(1)(c) of the TMD amendment proposal, EU Commission, supra note 
61: “The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in 
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adopted, it would create additional room for the CJEU to develop 
appropriate defenses. As currently proposed by the Commission, 
the new exception would apply horizontally to all exclusive rights, 
including the problematic double identity rule in Article 5(1)(a) of 
the TMD, where the flexible “due cause” defense is presently 
missing.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In relation to trademark law, the public domain can be 
understood to encompass all signs that are not protected as 
trademarks and all forms of using protected signs that fall outside 
the scope of the exclusive rights of the trademark owner. This 
notion includes (i) all signs that are generally excluded from 
trademark protection regardless of whether they are distinctive or 
not (unconditional exclusion), (ii) all signs that do not satisfy the 
basic protection requirement of distinctiveness (conditional 
exclusion), (iii) all forms of use that cannot be controlled by the 
trademark owner because of inherent limits of exclusive rights 
(implicit freedom of use) and (iv) all forms of use that cannot be 
controlled by the trademark owner because of the adoption of an 
exception (explicit freedom of use). 
Seeking to develop best practices, the following general 
guidelines for the introduction of exclusions can be given on the 
basis of the present analysis: an unconditional exclusion from 
trademark protection has an absolute effect in the sense that signs 
falling under the exclusion, regardless of their potential distinctive 
character, will never be eligible for trademark protection. On the 
one hand, the application of this outright bar to trademark 
protection ensures that the sign concerned, in any case, does not 
become subject to trademark rights. Use of the sign by other 
traders or the public at large always remains unencumbered by 
trademark rights. This guarantees that trademark protection will 
not restrict the sign’s availability. The sign remains in the public 
domain. On the other hand, an unconditional exclusion implies 
that, in cases where a sign does, in fact, have a distinctive 
character, or develops one through use,171 permitting 
                                                                                                                 
the course of trade […] the trade mark for the purpose of identifying or referring to goods or 
services as those of the proprietor of the trade mark, in particular where the use of the trade 
mark is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as 
accessories or spare parts; . . .”  
 171. This is not a mere theoretical option. In Lego/OHIM(Mega Brands), for instance, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 P, ¶ 40, 
explicitly pointed out that “[i]n the present case, it has not been disputed that the shape of 
the Lego brick has become distinctive in consequence of the use which has been made of it 
and is therefore a sign capable of distinguishing the appellant’s goods from others which 
have another origin.” Irrespective of the existence of distinctive character, however, the 
Court denied the acquisition of trademark rights in line with EU legislation to allow 
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unencumbered use of the sign by competitors may cause confusion 
among consumers who perceive the sign as a reference to a 
particular commercial source. In principle, advantages accruing 
from general availability for other traders and the public at large 
must thus be weighed against the potential risk of consumer 
confusion.172  
An exclusion that remains conditional, in the sense that 
trademark protection can be obtained once distinctiveness is 
acquired through use in trade, does not give rise to concerns about 
consumer confusion. However, it may undermine the objective of 
safeguarding the public domain by encouraging marketing 
strategies that aim specifically at the acquisition of trademark 
rights relating to the very signs that were intended to be kept free. 
A trademark system placing too much reliance on the requirement 
of distinctiveness as a preservation tool may thus give 
dysfunctional incentives.  
EU trademark law provides for a broader scope of 
unconditional exclusion of official signs than Article 6ter of the 
Paris Convention, namely, authorizing exclusion of signs of high 
symbolic value, in particular religious symbols. EU trademark law 
also provides for an unconditional exclusion of three-dimensional 
shapes that result from the nature of the goods, are necessary to 
obtain a technical result, or give substantial value to the goods. 
These shape exclusions can be seen as a means of enhancing 
competition in the marketplace.173 Moreover, the outright 
exclusion of technical shapes is a means of drawing a boundary 
line between trademark protection and patent protection. The 
exclusion of substantial value shapes can serve as a means of 
separating trademark protection, at least to some extent, from 
industrial designs protection. In this way, interferences of 
potentially indefinite trademark protection with intellectual 
property regimes providing for a limited term of protection for 
technological and aesthetic innovation are reduced. 
Where, however, the signs at issue are of a cultural or artistic 
nature, EU trademark law largely leaves the acquisition of 
trademark rights to whether an aspiring trademark owner can 
                                                                                                                 
competition in the marketplace and prevent undertakings from using trademark law “in 
order to perpetuate, indefinitely, exclusive rights relating to technical solutions” (¶ 45). 
 172. In this context, alternative legal mechanisms, such as general protection against 
unfair competition, may be factored into the equation to determine whether the potential 
risk of confusion can be minimized through protection standards outside trademark law. 
With regard to developments in the area of protection against unfair competition, see M. 
Höpperger & M.R.F. Senftleben, Protection Against Unfair Competition at the International 
Level—The Paris Convention, the 1996 Model Provisions and the Current Work of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, in 1 Law Against Unfair Competition—Towards a New 
Paradigm in Europe?, MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law 61 
(R. Hilty & F. Henning-Bodewig eds., Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer 2007). 
 173. CJEU, June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99, Philips/Remington, ¶ 78. 
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establish distinctive character. The exclusion of signs of cultural 
significance thus remains conditional. It can be overcome through 
use in trade in many cases. In consequence, a clear boundary line 
between trademark and copyright protection is missing. This 
decision causes imbalances within the intellectual property 
system. While EU trademark law seeks to prevent trademark 
protection from interfering with patent and (to some extent) 
industrial designs protection, comparable efforts to avoid 
dysfunctional overlaps between trademark and copyright 
protection are sought in vain. Once trademark rights are acquired, 
the impact on use of the sign in a cultural context must not be 
underestimated. The marketing messages attached to the sign 
may supersede its original cultural meaning. The existence of 
trademark rights may have a deterrent effect on use for cultural 
follow-on innovation. 
Against this background, the EU approach to signs of cultural 
significance is wanting. Instead of relying on the requirement of 
distinctive character, policy makers in other regions may better 
protect the public interest in shared cultural material by adopting 
an unconditional exclusion covering signs of cultural significance174 
or developing a broader notion of aesthetic functionality that goes 
beyond the piecemeal approach currently found in EU trademark 
law. The broader concept of aesthetic functionality should 
encompass all kinds of cultural creations, including drawings, 
paintings, photographs, and melodies.175  
A choice between the different types of exclusions from 
protection must also be made in the field of nontraditional marks. 
The CJEU applies an amalgam of conditional and unconditional 
exclusions in this area. While smell is excluded from trademark 
registration altogether on the grounds that it cannot be 
represented graphically, the Court has accepted sound marks, and 
particularly melodies, which can be represented by musical 
notation. With regard to shapes and color per se, the Court posited 
that consumers were not in the habit of making assumptions about 
the commercial origin of goods or services on the basis of these 
signs. Hence, the need to show distinctiveness obtained through 
use functions as an additional safeguard against the adoption of 
                                                                                                                 
 174. As to legislation that explicitly provides for grounds for refusal covering national 
cultural heritage objects and objects of world cultural or natural heritage, see K. Fedotova, 
Report on the Russian Federation, in Senftleben, supra note 2, at 249. 
 175. See also Ramsey, supra note 29, at 1169-1170, arguing that descriptive terms 
should be eliminated from protection as trademarks altogether. Considering that cultural 
signs can be seen as being descriptive with regard to cultural productions and information 
products, this proposal would also contribute to the preservation of signs of cultural 
significance. A trademark registration may remain possible, however, in cases where the 
registration is sought with regard to goods or services, in respect of which the cultural sign 
is chosen arbitrarily. 
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trademark rights. It remains to be seen whether this is sufficient 
to preserve the public domain.  
Given the open and broad definition of the subject matter of 
trademark protection in EU trademark law, the additional hurdle 
of distinctiveness acquired through use seems to constitute the 
maximum safeguard that the CJEU can offer under the current 
legislation. Lawmakers in other regions, however, need not follow 
the EU example. In accordance with Article 15(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, a country may require, as a condition of registration, 
that signs be visually perceptible. Smells, sounds, and melodies 
can thus generally be excluded from trademark protection. This 
strategy offers a more efficient preservation mechanism than the 
approach currently taken in the EU. 
In the area of inherent limits of, and exceptions to, exclusive 
trademark rights, a closer look at EU trademark law revealed that 
with the continuous expansion of trademark protection, inherent 
limits of exclusive rights—particularly its confinement to use of 
conflicting signs in trade and as a trademark—become less and 
less reliable safe harbors for socially and culturally valuable use, 
in particular when it comes to the protection of goodwill functions 
and broad protection against dilution and unfair free-riding. 
Accordingly, it has become more difficult to demarcate exactly the 
limits of actionable trademark use. Besides forms of use that 
would interfere with the essential trademark function of signalling 
the commercial origin of goods and services, EU trademark owners 
may also have success in invoking trademark rights against forms 
of use (such as criticism, comment, and parody) that do not impair 
the basic origin function, but may adversely affect brand image 
and goodwill.  
When the inherent limits of trademark rights become less 
clear and foreseeable for potential users, trademark protection is 
likely to have an increasingly deterrent effect on socially and 
culturally valuable use. The mere risk of being sued for trademark 
infringement because of a biting comment or parody may have a 
chilling effect, causing users to refrain from engaging in these 
forms of speech. To safeguard freedom of expression, it is thus 
advisable to reassure users of trademarked signs that certain 
forms of use are exempted from the control of the trademark owner 
by adopting appropriate exceptions that serve as defenses against 
alleged infringement.176 In this way, legal certainty can be re-
established, and socially and culturally valuable use can be 
encouraged.  
                                                                                                                 
 176. For a discussion of room for the adoption of appropriate limitations in international 
trademark law, see L.P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect 
Trademarks, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 405 (2010); K. Weckström, The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big 
Business: Comparing Approaches to the Balancing of Societal Interests Behind Trademark 
Protection, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 671 (2007). 
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On a positive note, this process has already started in the EU 
in certain respects. The CJEU uses the harmonized EU rules on 
comparative advertising as an external exception to trademark 
rights in order to offer sufficient breathing space for commercial 
freedom of speech. In keyword advertising cases, the Court 
developed a specific defense of “due cause” that can be invoked 
when the trademark is used to provide information on alternative 
offers in the marketplace. However, comparable efforts still have 
to be made to create sufficient room for criticism, comment, and 
parody, news reporting and news commentary, use for research 
and teaching, and use for cultural purposes. The proposal of the 
European Commission for amending EU trademark legislation 
seems to recognize this need for additional exceptions. It aims to 
exempt referential use in general.177  
Seeking to develop appropriate guidelines for policy makers, it 
may be said that, in the field of inherent limits and exceptions, an 
assessment of the legal certainty resulting from the general 
understanding of the inherent limits of trademark rights in trade 
circles and among the public should inform the decision on 
whether infringement criteria, such as use in trade and use as a 
trademark, are sufficient to support forms of use that should 
remain free, or whether the adoption of specific exceptions is 
required to offer sufficient legal certainty. The expansion of 
trademark protection in the EU has created a need for the 
adoption of new statutory defenses. Countries seeking to develop a 
comparable protection standard should take this need into account 
and consider devising new exceptions to support socially and 
culturally valuable forms of use.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See Article 14(1)(c) of the TMD amendment proposal, EU Commission, supra note 
61.  
